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COMMENT
No doubt virtually everyone in the Labor 
Party — and those on the left outside it — 
would agree that Labor’s present economic 
policy contains no strategy for a transition to 
socialism in Australia. While some members 
of the ALP clearly regard this as a virtue, 
s in c e , in  th e ir  v ie w , a s o c ia l i s t  
transformation of Australian society is 
neither possible nor desirable, others in the 
Labor Party retain a commitment to 
socialism. For them, a crucial question must 
be: what role can the ALP play in the 
development of a transitional strategy for 
Australia?
For too long, socialists in the ALP have 
given most ground to their rightwing 
opponents in the arena where they should 
have been strongest: economic policy. The 
left’s successes, such as they have been, are
nearly all in other areas. This is true, not only 
of the Whitlam government’s initiatives in 
foreign affairs, social welfare and urban 
development, but also to state Labor 
governments, such as those now in office in 
South Australia and New South Wales. 
Economic policy in Hayden’s ALP — or 
Wran’s or Dunstan’s for that matter — is 
dominated by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. How far — and how fast — a 
L a b o r  a d m in is t r a t io n  ca n  g o  in 
implementing social reforms is seen as 
limited by what’s happening at the economic 
level. The argument between the left and the 
right then becomes one over the tempo of 
change with both taking their cue from an 
economic reality both taken as given and 
fixed.
In these circumstances, it is important for 
those on the left, both within and outside the
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ALP, to search for an adequate way of posing 
the problem of a transition to socialism in 
Australia. For this, we need to tackle head-on 
the question of economic policy.
ALP discussion paper
Recently, the ALP’s Committee of Inquiry 
set up after the last Federal election tried to 
do this in a Discussion Paper called 
“ Econom ic Issues and the Future o f 
Australia” . Both the Committee of Inquiry 
and the ALP’s leadership have been careful 
to point out that this document is not ALP 
policy but has been produced to promote 
discussion. Nevertheless, this initiative is 
remarkable for the way in which it is trying 
to shift the terms of economic debate in this 
country to include not just the option but the 
necessity of a transition to socialism.
The discussion paper, the sixth issued by 
the Committee of Inquiry to promote debate 
in the ALP within different policy areas, was 
drafted by Geoff Harcourt, Professor of 
Economics at Adelaide University. It argues 
that a Labor government should not confine 
itself to administering a capitalist economy. 
It “ also must try to plan for a smooth path 
through the transition to a more just and 
equitable society” .
The current crisis in the Australian 
economy is deep-seated and long-term, the 
Committee of Inquiry argues. Present and 
past policies — including those of the 
previous Labor government — are not 
adequate to meet this crisis.
Unemployment is not just an immediate 
problem. “ Manufacturing, indeed the 
industrial sector as a whole, is stagnant or 
even declining” , the Committee points out. 
The reasons are familiar: inefficient plant, 
small-scale production, a small domestic 
market and real wage rates that are still 
higher than in some other competing 
countries.
Some investment is taking place in this 
sector but it will not solve the problem, since 
it is likely to be labor-saving in character.
“ In itself’ , the Committee goes on, “ the 
decline in employment in this sector because 
we are now able to meet our demands with 
lower overall labor inputs is not something to
be regretted. In fact, it should be the source of 
a higher standard of living if the labor 
displaced could be channelled into other uses 
(which could include more leisure for all of 
us). The large question, which, to date, has 
not been tackled at all adequately is ‘where 
to?’ That is why the present composition of 
our workforce and the trends in it are so 
disquieting.”
This explains why, the Committee says, 
there is such deep-seated opposition to tariff 
cuts within the ALP and especially in the 
trade union movement. “ If the Industries 
Assistance Commission efficiency-is-all 
approach is followed...those firms and 
industries which survived the long haul of 
tariff reform would provide rising real 
incomes for those who were still in 
employment...(but) this would be small 
comfort for the substantial numbers who 
would continue to remain in the reserve army 
of the structurally unemployed.”
“ Especially would this be so if the 
community continues its present barbarous 
and uncivilised attitude to those who are 
unemployed, ably spurred on and indeed led 
by the leaders of the present government in 
order to distract attention from their 
mismanagement.”
The Committee, however, does not plump 
for the opposite course of propping up 
inefficient industries with as much tariff 
protection as they need to survive. This 
“ inward looking” approach would mean 
“growth in productivity and real incomes 
could be sluggish or not-existent” . While 
“ faced with a clear choice between efficiency 
and employment there seems little doubt that 
the bulk of the electorate would chose 
employment” , the question still arises: is 
there another way?
As the Committee points out, these two 
scenarios are placed in the same analytical 
framework as that adopted by the I AC. That 
is, they rely on market forces as the guides to 
the potential outcomes. “ They are policies 
which would be adopted by an ALP which 
sees its role as m anoeuvring within 
capitalism rather than trying to restructure 
an economy in transition” , the Committee 
argues.
“ Capitalism has developed beyond the 
freely competitive phase, and beyond the 
monopolistic-competitive phase at the
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national level, to a phase of monopoly 
capitalism dominated by internationally 
operating corporations. This has two 
important im plications. Because the 
d o m in a n t  m ode o f  p r o d u c t io n  is 
international capitalism, the national 
economy is dependent on the decisions of 
private corporations whose interests do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the 
national economy.
“ Furthermore, the decisions are made by 
corporations acting at an international level. 
They therefore have no incentive to co­
ordinate their decisions with the strategy of 
national governments (although they do 
manipulate the reverse co-operation); they 
therefore  can  fru stra te  in d iv id u a l 
government’s policies and, indeed, entire 
strategies. This contradiction between 
national government and international 
capitalism leads to the conclusion that a 
trade policy which is purely protectionist 
cannot be effective even in terms of 
protecting employment for too long, as with 
accumulating pressure on the balance of 
trade and hence on the exchange rate created 
by such a policy, a multinational corporation 
can shift production to another base.
“ The failure explicitly to recognise the 
inter-relatedness o f unemployment, inflation 
and the international character o f 
production and marketing has led to a great 
deal of inconsistent ad hocery in economic 
policy-making by governments of both major 
political parties.”
Alternative approach
An alternative approach, the Committee 
suggests, is for a future ALP government to 
intervene in the economy by taking over the 
function individual corporations are 
evidently unwilling to perform: supplying 
investment funds.
“ An open economy reliant on private 
capital’s decisions is inherently unstable 
and tends to both  in fla t io n  and 
unemployment” , the Committee points out. 
“ Counter-cyclical policies aimed at 
administering capitalism and protectionist 
policies aimed at isolating manufacturing 
from competition with the rest of the world 
eventually will be ineffective. Thus the 
government’s intervention in a mixed 
economy must be of a changed nature.
“ It needs to create institutions that can 
encourage the level of private investment it 
considers desirable while engaging in the 
production of a surplus through its own 
activities such that it can fulfil its 
redistributive goals and provide a social 
wage without having to create ever- 
increasing deficits.
“ Incentive schemes which rely on private 
capital’s response are attempts to make the 
‘market’ allocate resources in a way it would 
otherwise not do. It is probably more 
‘inefficient’ for the public sector to take the 
initiative directly, in these new pursuits.”
Transitional policy
So far, most socialists would agree with 
this analysis and welcome the fact it is being 
put forward with such vigor from a perhaps 
unexpected source. However, at this point the 
Committee endorses a “ transitional policy” 
which has always been treated with a great 
deal of suspicion in the working class 
movement. In calling for an “ incomes policy 
in the transition” the Committee argues — 
correctly — that capitalist production bears 
no necessary relation to the productive 
service rendered. State intervention must 
therefore be of a different nature than just 
organising capital more efficiently. Its 
intervention needs to be of a nature whereby 
major private firms are taken into public 
ownership and investment expenditure 
decision in those firms made from that 
position.”
Does it follow, however, that an incomes 
policy administered (as the Committee 
suggests) by the Arbitration Commission 
should be part of such a transitional 
strategy?
The working class has had too long an 
experience o f incomes policies under 
capitalism — whether they have been called 
that or not — to accept a truce in the battle 
over the rate of exploitation without being 
convinced that exploitation itself had ended. 
In other words, until investment decisions 
which involve spending the non-wage 
portion of the national income are made 
collectively and democratically, workers will 
regard this part of the value they create as 
alien.
They will fight against any attempt to 
increase it at the expense of their wage
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income,' even if carried out by a government 
that they regard as representing them, and 
even, if the consequent investment is all 
directed to nationalised projects. This is not 
because o f selfishness. Rather, it is a 
recognition o f the real role of work as a labor 
creating process and the consequence — 
either in capitalist or in state-owned 
enterprises — of the products of the labor 
process becoming capital which then, as 
dead labor, dominates living labor, the 
worker.
Today, this occurs as dramatically in state- 
owned enterprises, such as Telecom, as it 
does in capitalist firms. It will only cease 
when the products of labor — whether they 
are consumer goods or investment goods — 
no longer dominate those who produce them. 
This requires much more thorough-going 
institutional changes than the ALP 
Committee of Inquiry seems prepared to 
contemplate. In particular, there would have 
to be democratisation of whole areas of life 
now regarded as the job of private capitalists 
or government representatives.
The attitude of any political party that 
advocates a transition to socialism to this 
devolution of political power will be a key test 
of its sincerity — and competence — to 
participate in that transition.
Another test of any political party 
advocating socialism is its assessment of, 
and attitude to, likely opposition. We need 
only recall the events in Chile during the 
period of the Allende government, or the 
investment strike that occurred in Australia 
under the Whitlam government, to see that 
the more drastic changes suggested in the 
Committee of Inquiry’s scenario are bound to 
be met with vicious opposition from 
international capital.
What is the Committee of Inquiry’s 
response to this possibility? “The successful 
maintenance of a private capital sector will 
depend on whether Australian and overseas 
investors will be prepared to work within 
such a framework” , the Committee says, “ or 
w hether th eir  in com e and ca p ita l 
withdrawals will be such as to put pressure 
on our balance of payments and exchange 
rate so as to make this approach impossible.
“ Especially will this be so if it also means 
that they are unwilling to undertake even the
much smaller amount o f private investment 
expenditure that is envisaged for them.
“Their reluctance should be reduced by the 
greater certainty with which future 
expectations could be held, since the 
economy’s costs would be more stable and its 
level of output and employment also more 
stable.
“ The taking over by the state of private 
firms was indeed hinted at by Keynes, 
namely, that investment may need to be 
socialised if the capitalist mode of production 
is to continue at all: what we must argue is 
that the economy would be a part of a more 
civilized society if the capitalist mode of 
production and the ruling ideas by which it 
exercises control became secondary to a more 
socialised mode of production.”
The Committee does not go on to discuss 
how this transition could be effected in the 
face of the violent opposition of domestic and 
international capital, but then that is a 
problem no grouping on the left, here or 
overseas, has adequately answered. It 
clearly raises the question of a political 
strategy to implement this economic policy. 
Maybe the Committee felt such questions 
were outside its brief. Certainly there are 
enough controversial issues raised in this 
document without treading on this even 
more sensitive ground.
Despite these limits the strategy put 
forward in this discussion paper deserves 
serious and wide-ranging discussion and 
comment. It represents a significant 
development in thinking on economic policy 
within the Labor Party, when compared, say, 
with the policy the left fought for at the 
ALP’s Perth Conference.
Revolutionaries outside the ALP are 
grappling with many o f the problems raised 
in this document and will disagree with 
much of it. Nevertheless, it opens the way to a 
debate on points of disagreement about the 
transition to socialism such as the role of 
incomes policies, workers’ control of 
production and the place of state institutions 
such as the Arbitration Commission — and 
parliament itself. All sections of the left 
should welcome — and participate in — this 
debate.
— Terry O’Shaughnessy 
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The theme of jobs and the environment is a 
timely and crucial one. Both are urgent and 
u n s o lv e d  p r o b le m s .  C a n a d ia n  
unemployment has jumped from a “normal” 
rate of 4 or 5 percent to 8.4 percent, the 
highest since World War II. In the United 
States, despite a 6.4 percent figure in 
December, unemployment averaged 7 
percent last year. About 15 percent of young 
workers are unemployed and nearly 40 
percent o f young, black workers are 
unemployed. At the same time, in spite of 
major legislation and a huge effort to clean 
up the environment, we are still plagued by 
pollution. Some environmental problems, 
like toxic chemicals, have become even 
worse. Their most serious effects, such as 
sterility and cancer, have been imposed on 
labor — the workers who produce and use 
these chemicals.
The persistent problems of unemployment 
and environmental decay have now been 
joined by a third one — the energy crisis. 
Although there is much confusion about 
what the energy crisis is, who is to blame for 
it and even if nothing is done, it will have 
enormous effects on both jobs and the 
environment, and indeed on all the other 
issues with which labor is concerned — 
prices, working conditions and the strength 
of the economy.
We therefore confront three serious, 
simultaneous problems: Unemployment, 
environment and energy. The worst feature 
of this troublesome triumvirate is that it 
seems impossible to solve any one problem 
without making the others worse.
When more than 20,000 U.S. steelworkers 
were laid off in the last six months and steel 
plants closed, the industry blamed the cost of 
pollution controls for its inability to compete 
with steel imports. Here in Canada we are 
told that to meet the nation’s energy needs, 
much of Alberta’s land and water must be 
diverted to mining tar sands, and that the 
resulting environmental damage must be 
borne as a kind of patriotic duty.
People seem ready to accept the notion that 
there are built-in, insoluble conflicts among 
the three goals of employment, energy 
sufficiency and environmental quality.
Compromise seems to be the only way out, 
trading off jobs for environmental quality 
and energy for agricultural land and clean 
waters. “There is no free lunch” , we are told: 
we cannot meet all these goals at once, 
something has to give. Anyone proposing to 
solve one of the problems is expected to 
question the importance of solving the 
others. The oil companies call for strong 
incen tives for oil and natural gas production, 
but we want environmental controls to be 
“reexamined” and made “ more reasonable” .
T h o se  o f  us w h o a re  seen  as 
“ environmentalists” are expected to argue 
strongly for environmental quality and 
energy conservation, making only some 
sympathetic sounds about the plight of the 
unemployed.
And inevitably, labor is caught in the 
middle. Utility executives and business 
leaders pressure labor to join battle against 
environmentalists, claiming that their 
opposition to nuclear power plants will throw 
people out of work. Auto executives pressure 
the unions to join in condemning gasoline 
conservation for fear that it will worsen the 
economic situation in the auto industry.
Before I examine this situation, let me 
make my own position unambiguously clear:
If there were in fact a conflict between jobs 
and environmental quality, or between 
maintaining the supply o f energy and 
ecological balance, I would personally favor 
actions that cut unemployment and 
maintain the flow of energy, and suffer the 
environmental consequences. I say this 
because my own interest in the environment 
and in a sensible energy policy is based on a 
much more fundamental aim — the 
improvement of human welfare. And I know 
of no way to accomplish that aim if people 
are out of work, if inflation is rampant and 
the economic system is in a decline.
I’d like to carry this argument even further, 
and assert that o f these three issues, the one 
which most urgently needs to be solved is 
unemployment, and the attendant problems 
of runaway inflation and economic decline. 
Unless we can solve the unemployment 
problem, the rest won’t matter very much. 
How long can we tolerate the rejection of one
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in every five workers — or two in five if they 
are black — trying to find their very first job; 
trying, as ev^ty young person must, to 
discover if theyfcan find a place in society? It 
is hard to conceive of a nation finding the 
will to tackle the enormously complex energy 
crisis or coping with thousands of chemical 
pollutants when the new generation which is 
supposed to reap the benefits of these 
improvements is condemned to such despair. 
Or to put it in more practical terms, an 
economic system incapable of finding work 
for such a large proportion of its new 
generation of workers could hardly be 
expected to muster the huge financial 
resources needed to clean  up the 
environment and to weather the energy 
crisis. On these grounds I am convinced that 
if we were forced to choose among them, the 
task of reducing unemployment and of 
rebuilding the faltering economy would have 
to take precedence over the energy and 
environmental crisis.
But are we in fact forced to make this 
desperate choice? Must we sacrifice 
environmental quality — which is, after all, 
also essential to human welfare — on the 
altar of high employment and economic 
stability? My answer is no.
I am aware that this is a strong claim 
which seems to fly in the face of common 
wisdom about our trio of crises. And I would 
agree, if you are convinced that people are 
unemployed because they don’t want to 
work, that the Arabs are to blame for the 
energy crisis and that pollution is due to our 
sloppy habits, it is indeed hard to see any 
connections among the three issues. Looked 
at this way, there does not seem to be a way to 
harmonize the three goals rather than 
compromise them; to solve all the crises 
rather than trying to improve one situation 
by worsening the others.
But if we look for more fundamental 
reasons why, like ancient Egypt, we have 
been afflicted with this series of unexpected 
plagues, we will discover that they are 
connected. More than that, we will discover 
that the only way to meet the fundamental 
needs of labor — to reduce unemployment 
and inflation and reverse the present 
economic decline — is to adopt a policy that 
would at the same time make sense out of the 
energy crisis and reduce pollution. The 
reverse is also true: the only sound energy
and environmental policy — a policy that 
can best give the nation a stable energy 
supply and a clean environment — is one 
that serve these needs of labor. This is the 
main point of my remarks, in which I hope to 
demonstrate why I have reached these 
conclusions.
To begin with, we must recognize that the 
place where labor works, where energy is 
produced and used, and where most 
environmental problems are created, is the 
same: the productive enterprise — the mine, 
the forestry, the farm. This means that the 
relation between the availability of jobs, the 
production and use o f energy and impact on 
the environment depends on how these 
productive enterprises are designed and 
operated — more generally, on the 
technology of production. In turn, the design 
and operation of a mine, a factory or farm 
involves economic factors: the wages paid to 
labor, the price of energy and other necessary 
inputs, the amount of capital needed to buy 
or build the productive machinery, the value 
of the goods that are produced and the 
expected rate of profit.
The welfare of labor — the availability of 
jobs, for example — depends on how this 
complex system operates, and that, in turn, 
depends on how all o f its different 
technological and economic elements are 
connected. What labor requires from this 
system, simply stated, is that it should 
operate at its highest possible capacity; that 
it should provide, for all who can work, 
decent jobs at decent pay, in conditions that 
protect safety and health; that the goods 
which it produces should be sold at prices 
that labor can afford; that inflation, which 
erodes the standard of living, should be 
controlled; that labor should be free to 
organize and to take part in the decisions 
which affect its welfare.
Our task here is to learn how the 
production and use of energy and the quality 
o f the environment affect these requirements 
which labor — and indeed society as a whole
— must place on the production and 
economic system. Specifically, we need to 
ask what energy policy will encourage strong 
economic activity, ample job opportunities, 
control inflation and enable labor to play its 
proper role.
The first, most obvious feature of such a 
policy is that energy must be available. It is a
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simple but often overlooked fact that every 
form of production — in factories, farms, 
transportation, offices — requires energy 
and cannot operate without it. This is the 
inescapable result of the plysical laws which 
govern the production and use of energy. 
These laws tell us that work must be done if 
we wish anything to happen that won’t 
happen by itself (for example, producing an 
auto) and that work can be done only if there 
is a flow of energy. Any block in the flow of 
energy means that production stops — and 
people lose their jobs. And a small 
interruption in the flow of energy can have a 
much larger effect on the economy. For 
example, when the American Midwest ran 
out of natural gas last winter — because 
Texas producers preferred to make an extra 
profit of $1 per thousand cubic feet by selling 
gas within the state rather than shipping it 
north at a lower, regulated price — the 
resulting economic dislocation involved 
losses, in wages alone, many times greater 
than the cost o f the missing fuel. No matter 
what else is done about energy, it must 
continue to flow if goods are to be produced 
and people are to remain at work.
The second basic point is that the 
availability of energy depends on its price. 
People have frozen to death because they 
couldn’t afford to pay their utility bill. In 
turn, the price of energy has a heavy 
influence on general inflation and worsens 
its damaging effects: reduced purchasing 
power, lowered demand for goods, depressed 
production and unemployment.
Because energy is used in producing all 
goods and services, when the price of energy 
rises it inevitably drives up the cost of 
everything else. When the price of energy, 
which was essentially constant for 25 years, 
suddenly began escalating in 1973, 
wholesale commodity prices followed suit. 
Before 1973 commodity prices had been 
inflating at a modest rate of about 2 percent a 
year. After 1973 they took off, going into 
double-digit figures in 1974, and since then 
running at more than 10 percent a year.
The prices of goods that are particularly 
dependent on energy are hardest hit by 
inflation. Unfortunately, these energy- 
intensive goods include housing (which 
depends on the cost of fuel and electricity), 
clothing (most of which is now made from
petroleum-based synthetic fabrics) and food 
(which now heavily depends on fertilizers 
and pesticides, chemicals made out of 
petroleum and natural gas). This puts a 
particularly heavy burden on the poor. In the 
United States, the poorest fifth of all families 
use about 25 percent of their budget to buy 
such energy-intensive items; the wealthiest 
fifth o f the families use only 5 percent of their 
budget for this purpose. When the price of 
energy rises the poor suffer most.
The rising price of energy also damages 
the economy and increases unemployment 
because of its influence on economic 
predictability. This is an important factor in 
a new industrial investment because an 
entrepreneur needs a reliable prediction of 
the long-term cost of the energy which will be 
needed to operate it. This is how the rate of 
return on the investment is computed — the 
famous “bottom line” which determines 
whether or not an investment will be made. 
The price of energy is now rising at a rate 
unprecedented in the history of the United 
States. In the ten years before 1973 the 
energy price index increased at about 3.7 
percent per year; in 1973-1976 it increased at 
the rate of 25 percent per year. The problem 
for the businessman is not so much the 
actual price of energy, since in most cases he 
can pass the cost — and usually a little more
— along to the customer. What the 
businessman cannot cope with is the rate of 
increase, because when the rate is very high 
it is also uncertain, making future energy 
costs highly unpredictable. Several business 
commentators have pointed to such 
uncertainties as a major cause of the present 
slow rate of investment — which means that 
plants are not built, and job opportunities are 
lost.
Unfortunately, nearly all o f our energy 
now comes from sources that must, 
inevitably, rapidly increase in price. Nearly 
all of our energy comes from oil, natural gas, 
coal and uranium. These are nonrenewable 
resources. They are limited in amount. We 
are “ running out” of them. At this point some 
people tend to visualize oil and gas supplies 
slowing down to a trickle as the underground 
pools run dry. But that is not the way it 
works. What happens as oil, for example, is 
taken out of the ground is that the easiest oil 
to produce is produced first. As a result, the 
cost of producing oil inevitably escalates as 
more oil is produced.
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As production o f oil, natural gas and, more 
recently, uranium, increases it becomes 
necessary to drill deeper, to tap smaller 
deposits and to use more expensive recovery 
methods. Inescapably, whenever the limited 
supply of a nonrenewable fuel is sufficiently 
dep leted , its price  b eg in s  to rise 
exponentially — tbat is, the higher the price, 
the faster the price increases.
In the case of oil, this is sometimes blamed 
on OPEC and the Arab states’ embargo. But 
in fact, two years before the embargo, the 
OPEC oil ministers got their cue from a 
massive and detailed report published by the 
U.S. National Petroleum Council. The NPC
— which should know, since it is composed of 
the officers of the U.S. oil companies — 
predicted that the price o f domestic U.S. oil, 
which had been essentially constant for the 
previous 25-30 years, would, beginning in 
1972-73, need to rise exponentially if the oil 
companies were to maintain their rate of 
return on investment. The OPEC oil 
ministers believed their American colleagues 
and took steps to see that they were not left 
behind.
In sum, the situation is this: As long as we 
continue to use nonrenewable energy 
resources, the price of energy will continue to 
escalate, causing a series of disastrous 
economic effects — rapid inflation, an 
erosion of the standard of livifig of poor 
fam ilies  and u n certa in ties  about 
investments in new production — all of 
which depresses the economy and worsens 
unemployment. Continued dependence on 
nonrenewable energy sources inevitably 
hurts the country, and labor in particular.
A third basic link between energy and the 
economy is provided by capital. We now hear 
frequent complaints in the financial columns 
that the present weakness of the economy is 
in good part due to the lag in new capital 
investment. This is an ominous sign, for a 
slow rate in investment in new productive 
enterprises today means much lower 
productive capacity — and job opportunities
— tomorrow. The availability o f capital, and 
the willingness o f investors to risk it in new 
productive enterprises, is a crucial feature of 
the economy’s health.
There is a close connection between the 
flow of energy and of capital. It is widely 
recognized that the availability of capital 
strongly influences energy production.
Utilities have been forced to abandon new 
construction projects (especially nuclear 
power plants) and investors have been forced 
to abandon synthetic oil and shale oil 
projects for lack of the necessary capital. 
What is less well-known is that the opposite 
connection is also important: The ways in 
which we now produce and use energy 
strongly influence the availability of capital, 
and therefore the rate of new investment 
which depends on it.
Various methods of producing energy 
differ considerably, in their capital 
productivity — that is, in the amount of 
energy (for example, BTU’s) produced 
annually per dollar of capital invested. One 
dollar invested in oil production (in 1974) 
produced about 17 million BTU’s of energy 
per year. But that same dollar invested in 
producing strip-mined coal yielded only 2 
million BTU per year; in shale oil about
40.000 BTU per year; and nuclear power 
brings up the rear with the equivalent of
20.000 BTU per year. Thus, any energy 
policy which emphasizes the production of 
electricity (particularly from nuclear power 
plants), rather than direct burning of fuel; 
which favors the use of coal over oil and 
natural gas; or which emphasizes the 
production of synthetic or shale oil, would 
worsen the energy industry’s already serious 
drain on the availability of capital.
Each of the different ways of producing 
energy also has its own particular demand 
for labor. For example, in 1973 for every unit 
of energy yielded (trillion BTU’s), oil and 
natural gas extraction created six jobs; strip 
mining, six jobs; deep coal mining, 18 jobs. 
As a result of these differences, and 
differences in capital productivity, the same 
amount of capital invested in different ways 
of producing energy can have very different 
effects on unemployment. For example, one 
calculation shows that a given amount of 
capital would produce two or four times 
as many jobs if invested in solar energy 
rather than electricity generation. A report to 
the New York State Legislative Commission 
on Energy Systems calculated that 
investment in energy conservation would 
produce about three times as many jobs as 
the same capital invested in nuclear power.
Finally, the impact of different forms of 
energy production on working conditions 
and on the general environment also vary a
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great deal. The physical dangers of work in 
coal mines and the risk of diseases such as 
black lung are well known.
In the nuclear power industry, uranium 
miners are exposed to particularly high risks 
of radiation-induced cancer. The risks of 
radiation to other workers in the industry are 
still poorly understood, but some recent 
studies suggest that they may be higher than 
most earlier estimates. Shale oil production 
and conversion of coal to synthetic fuels 
produce highly carcinogenic substances; 
workers in a pilot coal conversion plant 
operated in West Virginia in the 1960s 
suffered 16-37 times the incidence of skin 
cancer as comparable workers in different 
jobs. There may be similar problems in tar 
sands operations.
The environmental impact of different 
energy sources closely parallels their impact 
on the workers’ health. Coal mining, shale oil 
and tar sands oil production devastate the 
land and use large amounts of scarce water. 
Coal conversion operations are heavy 
polluters of the air. Coal-burning power 
plants pollute the air with nitrogen oxides, 
sulfur dioxide and carcinogens. The nuclear 
power industry has yet to solve its serious 
environmental problems, such as safe 
disposal of radioactive wastes. When energy 
is conserved all of these difficulties are, to 
that extent, reduced. And if solar energy were 
used instead o f these conventional sources, 
environmental impact would be very sharply 
reduced.
From these considerations it is apparent 
that the effect of energy production on major 
factors which govern the welfare of the 
nation, and of labor in particular — inflation, 
employment, the availability of capital, 
working conditions and environmental 
quality — varies greatly depending on the 
form of energy which is produced. While a 
continuous flow o f energy in some form is 
essential to keep the production system 
going and the economy strong, the way the 
flow is sustained can have the opposite 
effect. For example, if we choose to sustain 
the necessary flow of energy by relying 
heavily on very capital-intensive sources of 
energy (such as nuclear power, shale oil 
production and the production of synthetic 
fuels from coal) the enormous drain on 
capital will hinder investments in the 
productive enterprises that use the energy,
and will seriously disrupt econom ic 
development. It is true that continued 
production of energy is essential to the 
economy. But is it also true that we could 
literally bankrupt the economy by investing 
heavily in the wrong kinds of energy 
production.
Perhaps the most striking example of this 
danger is nuclear power, as Saunders Miller, 
a prominent utilities investment counselor, 
has pointed out:
Based upon thorough in-depth analysis, the 
conclusion that must be reached is that, from an 
economic standpoint alone, to rely upon nuclear 
fission as the primary source of our stationary 
energy supplies will constitute economic lunacy on 
a scale unparallelled in recorded history, and may 
lead to the economic Waterloo o f the United States. 
( 1)
If we turn now from the ways in which we 
produce energy to a consideration of the 
ways in which we use it, we see once more 
that there are profound differences which 
seriously affect both labor and the national 
welfare. Here we need to consider how 
efficiently energy, capital and labor are used 
in production processes. A convenient way to 
measure these efficiencies is in terms of the 
productivity of an enterprise, such as a 
particular manufacturing operation. This 
measures how much economic gain — 
usually expressed as value added — is 
produced per unit of energy, capital or labor 
used. Thus, three basic productivities need to 
he considered:
Energy productivity, or how efficiently the 
enterprise converts the energy that it uses 
into value added. This is measured as: 
dollars of value added per BTU used in 
production.
Capital productivity, or how efficiently the 
enterprise converts the capital invested in it 
into value added. This is measured as: 
dollars of value added per dollar of capital 
invested.
Labor productivity, or how efficiently 
labor is converted into value added. This is 
measured as: dollars o f value added per man- 
hour.
Let us compare the productivities of two 
industries which produce competing 
materials: leather products and the chemical 
industry which produces the plastics that
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have so heavily replaced leather and other 
natural materials. Of the two industries, 
leather production is about 4.5 times more 
efficient in converting capital into value 
added, and nearly 13 times more efficient in 
its use of energy. This relationship between 
capital and energy productivity is quite 
general among different industries. Five 
industries (petroleum products, chemicals, 
stone, clay and glass products, primary 
metals and paper) account for about 59 
percent of the electricity and 77 percentofthe 
total enei'gy used in manufacturing. They 
also have the lowest capital and energy 
productivities of all major sectors of 
manufacturing.
There is a good correlation between energy 
productivity and capital productivity, 
because energy is used to run the machines 
purchased by capital; the more capital 
(machinery) involved in an industry, the 
more energy it uses, and in many cases, this 
means fewer jobs, since the energy is often 
used to replace human labor.
For example, for the same economic output 
the chemical industry uses less than one- 
fourth the amount of labor used in the leather 
industry.
Another important feature o f the relation 
between energy and the economic system is 
that — strange as it may seem in ihe light of 
supposed economic principles — capital and 
energy tend to flow toward those enterprises 
that use them least efficiently. Capital used 
in industrial production flows heavily 
toward those sectors which are low in both 
e n e rg y  p r o d u c t iv i t y  an d  c a p ita l  
productivity. For example, the five industries 
cited earlier that use energy and capital least 
efficiently use nearly one-half of the capital 
invested in all manufacturing industries. In 
contrast, the seven most energy-efficient 
industries (such as leather production) use 
only seven percent o f the capital invested in 
manufacturing.
As pointed out earlier, various ways of 
producing energy also differ significantly in 
their capital productivity (i.e., how 
efficiently capital is used to produce energy). 
Here, too, capital tends to flow toward those 
enterprises which use it least efficiently. For 
example, although electric power represents 
only 21 percent of the total amount of energy 
which we use, it consumes 56 percent of the 
capital invested in energy production. At the
sam e tim e, due to th erm od yn am ic 
limitations, no morethanone-third of the fuel 
used to drive a power plant is converted into 
electricity. Electric power is therefore by far 
the most expensive form of energy in terms of 
capital expenditure. When electricity is used 
to produce space heat, more than 97 percent 
o f the thermodynamic value of the original 
energy is wasted. Yet about a fifth of U.S. 
electric power is used in this way — an 
enormous waste, not only o f energy, but also 
o f the capital needed to produce job- 
generating factories and homes.
In recent years industries with high energy 
and capital productivity (such as leather) 
have given way to industries with low capital 
and energy productivities (such as plastics). 
This is particularly true of the displacement 
o f natural products (leather, cotton. wooL 
wood, paper and soap) by synthetic ones 
(plastics, synthetic fibers and synthetic 
detergents). For the reasons cited earlier, this 
displacement not only drains supplies of 
energy and capital, but also worsens 
unemployment. In the U.S. about half of the 
unemployment is “ technological” . That is, 
job opportunities are lost when such new 
production technologies are introduced and 
cut the overall demand for labor — and 
usually disproportionally increase the 
demand for energy and capital.
Now we can see the basic links among 
energy, the economic system and the 
environment.
The same shifts in production technology 
that reduced the productivity of capital and 
energy and have cut the number of jobs 
usually increased the impact of production 
on the environment. As synthetic products 
replaced natural materials, more petroleum 
and natural gas were used both as raw 
materials and for fuel, polluting the 
environment with combustion products and 
toxic chemicals. The petrochemical industry 
demonstrates the close links among the 
wasteful use o f energy and capital, the 
assau lt on the en v iron m en t and 
unemployment.
Thus, we find that unemployment is part of 
the same economic trends that generated the 
energy crisis and the environmental crisis. 
Energy has been produced increasingly in 
forms (especially electric power, and nuclear 
power in particular) which use a great deal of 
capital relative to the amount of energy that
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they yield. As a result, energy production has 
claimed an increasing proportion of the 
capital available for business investment, 
making it less available for investment in 
new job-creating enterprises. (In 1960, 
energy production claimed 26 percent of the 
capital invested in industry; by 1980 it is 
expected to claim more than a third.) At the 
same time, industries which use energy 
inefficiently also use capital inefficiently; 
they also pollute the environment most 
heavily and are often least effective in 
creating jobs. In sum, the same economic 
tendencies — the displacement of labor by 
energy-driven machines — that have 
worsened employment carry a good deal of 
the responsibility for the energy crisis and 
the environmental crisis. The crisis in 
employment, energy, and the environment 
are, in this sense, the same crisis.
Against this background what can be said 
about Carter’s National Energy Plan, which 
is the United States’ first effort to establish a 
comprehensive energy policy? Judged by the 
standards developed above, most of the plan 
must be given rather bad marks, especially 
for its effect on labor. The plan is based on 
the strategy of raising energy prices as a 
means o f encouraging energy conservation. 
Leaving aside the fact that the plan would in 
fact accomplish very little conservation 
(only 16 percent of the increased demand for 
energy between now and 1985 would be met 
by conservation) this approach will only 
worsen inflation, and with it unemployment 
and all the economicills which trouble labor.
The plan mandates a sharp increase in the 
present rate o f nuclear power plant 
construction and in the use of coal, with a 
resulting doubling in the contribution of 
electricity to the energy to be acquired 
between now and 1985. This means heavy 
reliance on the ways of producing energy 
that are most wasteful of capital, a step that 
is certain to add to our present economic 
difficulties. At the same time, by increasing 
the availability of electricity (relative to 
direct use of fuel) the plan would encourage 
those industries that are power-intensive — 
and which are thereby likely to use little 
labor. Finally, the plan would create 
enormous new environmental difficulties, 
because it relies so heavily on the two 
methods of producing energy that most 
severely threaten the environment — the use 
of coal and nuclear energy.
In sum, the National Energy Plan is likely 
to aggravate the energy crisis rather than 
solve it, for it would worsen the main effects 
of the energy crisis: inflation, unemployment 
and economic uncertainty. This means, I 
fear, that if the plan is enacted in anything 
remotely resembling its present form, we will 
be confronted even more by the divisive 
antagonisms among those concerned with 
u n e m p lo y m e n t , e n e r g y  and  the 
environm ent-antagonism s that only 
contribute confusion to a debate that cries 
out for clarity.
Is there no way out? There is. There are 
alternatives to the nuclear power plants, the 
strip mines, the coal gasification projects, to 
the continued use of oil and natural gas 
which will rise in price forever. The 
alternative is, o f course, solar energy.
Now at this point many people will react 
with a faraway look in their eyes, and 
perhaps with some im patience and 
frustration, expecting to hear another one of 
those pie-in-the-sky schemes about a 
beautiful solar future. But that is not what I 
am talking about. I am not going to tell you 
that all will be well if we do more research on 
so la r  energy, set up a few  more 
demonstration houses or learn how to build a 
solar power plant in space. What I am going 
to tell you — and not on my own authority, 
but on the authority of U.S. government 
agencies — is that for most methods of using 
solar energy the technology is already in 
hand, and can be introduced at once in most 
parts of the country, for a wide variety of 
uses, at economically competitive cost. To 
many people, and apparently to some 
government officials, this is news. But it is 
good news, for the most important thing 
about so lar energy is th at, unlike 
conventional energy sources, it will stabilize 
the price of energy, slow inflation and 
improve investment planning; it will create 
rather than destroy jobs; it can turn the 
country’s faltering economy around. It can 
give us a real energy plan that solves the 
energy crisis rather than making it worse — 
the kind of energy plan that meets the needs 
of labor.
Here are a few reminders about solar 
energy.
First, unlike oil, natural gas, coal or 
uranium, solar energy is renewable; it will
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never run out (or at least not in the next few 
billion years). Because solar energy is 
renewable it is not subject to diminishing 
returns — which means that its price, instead 
of escalating like the price of present energy 
sources, will be stable and even fall as the 
cost of devices continues to decline. By 
stabilizing the price of energy, solar energy 
reduces the threat of inflation and eases the 
task of planning investments in new 
productive enterprises, thus relieving two of 
today’s worst economic problems.
Second, the use of solar energy does not 
depend on any single technique. There are 
different sources of solar energy, some forms 
more available in one place and other forms 
in other places. Everywhere that the sun 
shines, solar energy can be trapped in 
collectors and used for space heat and hot 
water. Of course, the amount of sunshine 
varies from place to place, but not as much as 
most people think. The sunniest place in the 
United States, the Southwest, gets only twice 
as much sunshine as the least sunny place, 
the Northwest. In some places the most 
available form of solar energy may be wind 
(the wind blows because the sun heats the air 
on the earth’s surface unevenly). In 
agricultural areas solar energy will be 
available in the form of organic matter 
(which is produced by plantst, through 
photosynthesis, from sunshine);' manure, 
plant residues, or crops grown to be 
converted into methane (the fuel of natural 
gas) or alcohol. In forested areas, waste 
wood, or even wood grown for the purpose, 
can be converted into heat, either directly, or 
by being made into gas. And wherever the 
sun shines, photovoltaic cells can be used to 
convert solar energy directly into electricity.
Third, for each of these solar processes the 
scientific basis is well understood and the 
technological devices have been built and are 
in actual use. Solar collectors are used all 
over the world, and were once (about 30 years 
ago) common in Florida and California; 
small windmills used to dot the farm 
landscape; methane plants are in operation 
in hundreds of thousands of Indian and 
Chinese villages; alcohol produced from 
grain was used extensively, mixed with 
gasoline, to run cars and trucks during World 
War II; photovoltaic cells now power 
satellites and remote weather stations. Of 
course solar energy needs to be stored during
the night or over cloudy periods. This can be 
done in batteries, in tanks of alcohol or 
methane, in silos full o f grain, as standing 
timber, or for that matter in piles of manure. 
All these items exist.
The main questions are, once again, 
economic. Granted that most solar 
technology exists, does it pay to introduce it? 
More precisely, the question is not whether it 
will pay, but when. The cost of conventional 
n on ren ew able  fuel is now  ris in g  
exponentially, and will do so indefinitely. 
Since it is renewable, the cost of solar energy 
is fixed only by the cost of the equipment, 
which will fall in price as experience is 
gained. Place these two curves on the same 
time scale and inevitably they will sooner or 
later cross. Solar energy, which a few years 
ago was m ore exp en sive  than the 
conventional alternatives, will inevitably 
equal them in price and then each year 
become cheaper relative to conventional 
energy.
Estimates of when and how solar energy 
systems become economically advantageous 
have now been made by the Solar Energy 
Task F orce o f  the F ederal E nergy 
Administration (now part of the new 
Department of Energy). Here are the main 
features of the Task Force’s “ National Solar 
Energy Plan” :
Solar heating: In most of the central part of 
the United States, if the government 
provided low-cost loans, it would today pay a 
nousenolder wno uses electricity or oil tor 
space heat and hot water to replace about 
half of it with a solar collector system. Even 
borrowing all the necessary funds at eight 
percent interest, with a 15-year amortization 
period, would cut the average annual heating 
bill by 19-20 percent.
Photovoltaic electricity: Here is the biggest 
surprise. For a long time even those of us 
most optimistic about solar energy were 
convinced that this technology — a 
wonderfully simple way to produce 
e le c tr ic ity  from  su n sh in e — was 
unfortunately so expensive as to remain 
uncompetitive for some time to come. Now 
the FEA report shows that the production of 
electricity from photovoltaic cell systems can 
ccompete with conventional power sources 
and exactly how that can be accomplished. 
The report show s that, b eg in n in g  
immediately for the more expensive
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installations such as gasoline-driven field 
generators, within two years for road and 
parking lot lighting, and within five years 
for residential electricity in the Southwest, 
p h o t o v o l t a i c  u n its  can  c o m p e te , 
economically, with conventional power. All 
that is required to achieve this remarkable 
accomplishment is the investment of about 
$0.5 billion in the purchase of photovoltaic 
cells by the U.S. government. This would 
allow the government to order about 150 
million watts capacity of photovoltaic cells. 
The order would allow the industry to expand 
its operations sufficiently to reduce the price 
of the cells from the current price of $15/watt 
(peak) to $2-3/watt in the first year; to 
$l/watt in the second year and to $0.50/watt 
in the fifth year, achieving the competitive 
positions noted above and successfully 
invading the huge market for conventional 
electricity. A similar federal (or state) 
purchase plan could bring large-scale power- 
generating windmills down to a competitive 
price, according to the FEA report.
Methane and alcohol production from 
org a n ic  m atter : W hile m ethods o f  
commercializing these sources of solar 
energy have not yet been worked out by the 
FEA task force, current research already 
begins to show how that can be done. Public 
works funds can be used effectively to rebuild 
urban garbage and sewage-sludge disposal 
systems so that they generate methane, 
which can help meet a city’s energy demand. 
In certain farm operations — such as a dairy 
with 200 or more cows or a farm raising 5,000 
or more chickens — it is already economical 
to replace current manure-disposal systems 
with methane generation, using it, for 
example, to produce electricity to drive farm 
machinery and heat to warm the barns. In 
Texas, one company has already begun to 
sell methane produced from feed-lot manure 
to the natural gas pipelines. Several 
Midwestern states are actively developing 
alcohol production from grain, as a partial 
substitute for gasoline in cars, trucks and 
tractors.
The most important aspect of solar energy, 
I believe, would be its effect on employment 
and economic recovery, but solar energy has 
another unique feature — it has no economy 
of scale.
In all conventional energy production 
there is a very large economy of scale: the
cost of the energy falls sharply with the size 
of the unit. Solar energy is very different. 
When a farmer wants to produce more corn 
he does not produce bigger corn plants, but 
plants more of them over a larger area. And 
each com plant operates at the same 
efficiency, so that one acre o f corn traps solar 
energy as efficiently as 1,000 acres of corn. 
The same is true of all solar techniques, such 
as photovoltaic cells. You can run a 
flashlight or a whole house on photovoltaic 
cells, at the same energetic efficiency.
In conventional energy production the 
large economy of scale means that only very 
large corporations can compete (that 
explains why the energy corporations are 
such big ones). In solar energy production a 
small or middle-sized com pany (or a 
household) can do as well as a corporate 
giant. As a result, huge, centralized solar 
installations are unneeded. The power can be 
produced on a scale that matches its use, 
where it is used, thus eliminating the need for 
heavy transmission systems (although light 
ones will be useful to balance out production 
and demand).
It is easy to see that the introduction of 
solar energy would mean a rebuilding of not 
only our system of energy production, but 
also many of the ways in which energy is 
used in manufacturing, agriculture and 
transportation. This would mean a vast 
program of new construction. It would create 
new jobs, and in doing so begin to control 
inflation.
The point of the foregoing analysis of the 
economic consequences o f different ways of 
producing and using energy is not so much to 
support this particular theory about the role 
of energy in the production and economic 
system. What I wish to emphasize is the 
basic point that all energy sources and ways 
of using energy in production are not alike in 
their effects on jobs, inflation and economic 
stability, and therefore on the interests of 
labor. Yes, some form of energy must be 
available if production and the economy is to 
continue — if goods are to be produced and if 
people are to have jobs and afford to buy 
what they need. But it makes a big difference 
which form of energy is chosen to support 
production, and how it is used. Choose the 
wrong form of energy and the effort to 
support the economy and create jobs will 
have the reverse effect.
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Consider, for example, the often-repeated 
claim that nuclear power plant construction 
is a good way to produce energy, support the 
economy and create jobs. This claim simply 
does not stand up before the facts. When 
compared with alternative ways o f 
producing the needed energy, nuclear power 
is not the best way to sustain the economy 
and to provide jobs. Here is a concrete 
example: The Fiat Company, in Italy, has 
just announced the availability  o f a 
cogeneration unit (“TOTEM” ) which uses 
natural gas, or methane produced from a 
solar source, to drive a converted gasoline 
en g in e, p rod u cin g  e le c tr ic ity  and 
recapturing the normally wasted heat as a 
source of space heat. About 67,000 TOTEM 
units would produce a total of about 1,000 
megawatts of power — the capacity of a 
typical U.S. nuclear power plant. However, 
wbereas the nuclear plant would cost about 
$1 billion, the TOTEM units would cost only 
$191 million, and they would produce 
electricity at about one-fourth of the cost of 
electricity from the nuclear plant.
The econ om ic  e ff ic ie n c y  o f  such 
cogeneration units, as compared with 
nuclear power means not only lower 
electricity prices, but also a more effective 
use of capital, therefore more opportunities 
for productive investment of capital — and 
more jobs. Because they can run on methane
— a renewable solar fuel — such units can 
help bridge the gap between our present 
dependence on nonrenewable fuels and a 
solar economy.
As should be evident from F iat’s 
accomplishment, such units could readily be 
manufactured in U.S. and Canadian auto 
plants, where they could take up the slack 
created by the disruptive effects of the energy 
crisis.
It is also informative to compare nuclear 
power with photovoltaic cells. If the proposed 
U.S. federal purchase plan were carried out, 
in five years or so the photovoltaic industry 
would expand enough to begin to allow local 
installations to compete economically with 
nuclear power in many parts of the United 
States. Again, many more jobs would be 
created by the solar technology than the 
nuclear one. The widespread availability of 
competitive photovoltaic cells would also 
create many opportunities for new types of
industrial production. For example, it would 
encourage the development of battery 
operated hand-tools, since batteries could 
readily be recharged by a photovoltaic unit 
mounted on the factory roof.
These are only two examples of the choices 
that are now open to us, and I mention them 
only to emphasize that there are choices. 
There is only one way in which the familiar 
arguments that pit jobs against the 
environment, that put labor leaders on the 
side of nuclear utility executives, make sense. 
And that is if we accept the assumption that 
the alternative to a new nuclear power plant 
is no new electricity and that the alternative 
to massive strip mining is no new sources of 
heat. In other words, this argument holds 
only if we give up the right to choose, among 
the different ways of producing energy, those 
which best serve the nation’s — and labor’s
— needs. Then, of course, the bitter choice 
between jobs and the environment must be 
made, for if the flow o f energy is disrupted we 
will surely suffer massive unemployment 
and economic disaster.
Labor groups have often decided to support 
nuclear power, shale oil production, coal 
conversion and similar energy sources 
which, on the basis o f the foregoing analysis, 
seem not to be in labor’s interests. But I  know 
of no instance in which such support has 
been based on an actual comparison with 
alternative sources o f energy. In every case, 
it is not a matter of making the wrong choice, 
but of avoiding a choice — in the belief that 
energy is essential for production and jobs 
(which is correct) and that all forms of energy 
will yield the same beneficial effects (which 
is not correct). Resolutions have been passed 
by labor groups which in one place strongly 
urge a fight for jobs and against inflation, 
and elsewhere urge the development of all 
forms of energy, listing sources such as 
nuclear power and coal conversion — which 
are bound to do employment and inflation 
more harm than good — alongside solar 
energy, which is labor’s most powerful 
weapon against energy-driven inflation and 
unemployment.
If labor is to win its fight for jobs, for 
reasonable prices, for decent working 
conditions and for a strong economy, it must 
accept the responsibility of deciding, for 
itself, which forms of energy and which ways 
of using it will best sustain these aims. Up to
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now these decisions have been made not by 
labor, but by management. And now that 
management’s choices — for nonrenewable 
sources such as oil and capital-intensive 
sources such as nuclear power, rather than 
the solar alternative — have precipitated the 
energy crisis, the decisions are being made 
by government executives and legislators. 
But, again, labor is on the sidelines.
Unless labor enters into the debate — on its 
own terms, making its own decisions about 
what energy policy best serves the needs of 
society, and of labor in particular — we will 
make the same disastrous mistakes once 
more. Nor is it enough for labor to rely on 
“ environmentalists” and other people of 
goodwill to suggest the right way to produce 
and use energy. There is no guarantee, for 
example, that an energy policy will be free of 
serious economic and social disadvantages 
just because it is based on solar energy. 
Devotion to solar energy is not, after all, 
proof against indifference to social welfare, 
greed or simple foolishness.
Consider for example two different ways to 
achieve a transition to solar energy. One 
option is deliberately to increase the price of 
conventional energy, so that solar 
technologies will become more quickly 
competitive. The other is to hold down the 
price of Conventional energy as much as 
possible and use public funds to cut the cost 
of solar alternatives and make them 
competitive. For the reasons already given, 
the first approach would place an intolerable 
economic burden on the people, especially 
the poor and the minorities, who suffer most 
from unemployment.
At the same time, wealthier people would 
benefit from the transition. This strategy 
Would increase both the general cost of 
Energy and the price the consumer needs to 
pay to shift to a solar source. Poor people, 
Unable to afford the high price of the new 
solar technology, would be forced to pay 
higher fuel prices, while wealthy people, who 
could afford the solar investment, could 
Avoid buying the high-priced fuel. The 
strategy of raising fuel prices in order to 
Encourage solar energy would tax the poor 
And favor the rich, justifying the suspicion 
Already being voiced that public movements 
lor energy conservation and solar energy are 
likely to be more in the interest of the wealthy 
than of the poor and the unemployed.
Perhaps the most serious dangers of this 
approach arise from a feature which in some 
quarters would be regarded as a virtue — the 
strategy relies on the “ free marketplace” to 
govern  the in trod u ction  o f  so lar 
technologies. Bluntly stated, this means that 
the introduction of each solar technology 
would be governed by a single criterion — 
that it generate a profit for its producer 
greater that one he might obtain from an 
alternative investment. Such a strategy 
would please the companies now entrenched 
in the energy field. The oil companies would, 
of course, benefit from higher oil and natural 
gas prices. Even if the price increase were 
generated by taxes, it would make the oil 
companies’ holdings in coal and uranium 
more valuable, and help support the price of 
oil in the world market — in which most of 
the U.S. companies are also involved. 
Private utilities could also benefit, by using 
their position in the consumer market and 
their access to capital to sell or lease to their 
customers whatever solar technologies are 
most profitable and least damaging to their 
centralized operations.
The last to gain from such a solar 
transition would be the poor. They would 
need to wait for benefits until, in the course of 
time, the massive substitution of solar 
energy for conventional sources stabilized 
the rising price of energy, and reduced the 
rate o f general inflation. Finally, when the 
cost of the solar technologies fell far enough, 
the poor could afford them too. Such a profit- 
oriented transition would mean that the 
benefits of solar energy would be allowed, as 
usual, only to trickle down to the mass of 
people.
Clearly, it would not serve labor’s interests
— or for that matter, the nation’s — to rely on 
such an approach to an environmentally- 
sound system of solar energy. Rather, labor 
and the nation need an approach which 
perm its ra tion a l p la n n in g  o f  the 
development, testing and introduction of 
solar technologies in keeping with their 
efficacy in the overall process of transition 
rather than on the basis of the narrow 
criterion of profitability. This approach 
would, of course, challenge the widely 
fostered notion that private profit is the sole 
acceptable basis for new productive 
investments. But this has happened before in 
connection with the development of energy
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resources — notably in the development of 
hydroelectric projects, in particular the 
Tennessee V a lley  A u th or ity , rural 
electrification and most recently nuclear 
power. In each case, the creation of the 
system required public initiative and at least 
the initial investment of public funds. The 
issue is not necessarily one of public 
ownership, since in the case of nuclear 
power, the decision to develop it and the 
design of the technology was determined 
socially, while the ownership and operation 
of most of the industry has been in private 
hands. The example of nuclear power should 
also remind us that social governance of 
such decisions is by no means a guarantee 
that they will be in the best interest of 
society. Social governance is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for maximizing 
social welfare.
An independent labor position on energy 
could provide a powerful remedy for some of 
the serious economic difficulties of American 
and Canadian industry. Many industries — 
automobiles, steel, textiles, shoes and 
electronics — are being forced to cut back 
because they cannot compete with imports. 
These industries face the enormously 
difficult job o f overcoming the economic 
advantages of foreign producers, achieved 
by their more modern productivefacilities, in 
order to regain their share of the market. 
Meanwhile, plants close and people are 
thrown out o f work.
From what has been said earlier it should 
be evident that to cope with the energy crisis, 
all industrial countries will need to develop 
new renewable sources o f energy and new 
energy and capital-efficient production 
technologies. Promising examples are 
photovoltaic cells and cogeneration units 
such as Fiat’s TOTEM. Consider this very 
sobering possibility: that U.S. and Canadian 
industry, still locked in the old pattern of 
producing and using energy, will not move 
quickly enough to develop photovoltaic cells 
and cogeneration units, failing to meet the 
inevitable demand for them.
If that happens, we will soon see Japanese 
photovoltaic cells and Italian cogeneration 
units capturing not just a part of the North 
American market, but all of it. We will have 
been frozen out of a good chunk of the 
en o rm o u s  w o r ld -w id e  in d u s t r ia l  
transformation that is certain to take place
under the impetus of the energy crisis.
I believe that labor can protect us from this 
fate, strengthen economic development and 
create jobs by taking its rightful place in the 
decision-making process that will determine 
our response to the energy crisis. Labor has 
the most to lose from the wrong decisions, 
and the most to gain from the right ones. 
Labor has the experience to understand how 
old production facilities can be converted to 
new uses and how to train workers in the new 
skills. Labor has the experience to defeat the 
notion, already being heard in some 
quarters, that union labor would drive prices 
up and make the solar transition that such 
harder, and to show that non-union labor 
would mean shoddy workmanship that could 
only hold back the new technologies. Finally, 
only labor has the political strength to break 
the corporate stranglehold on energy and to 
help society apply the power of public 
governance to the creation of a new energy 
system that can truly serve human welfare.
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10 YEARS LATER
JIRI PELIKAN
The “ Prague Spring” of Czechoslovakia, 
1968, is still discussed ten years after it was 
quelled  by d irect S ov iet m ilitary  
intervention. Voices are still raised in 
P ra g u e , d e s p ite  r e p r e s s io n  and 
“normalisation” — like those of Dubcek, 
Kriegel, Kahout, Vaculik and other 
protagonists o f 1968 who remain faithful to 
the ideals of the Prague Spring; the youth 
and political fringe; Christians; liberals and 
forbidden underground cultural movements 
which reject the hypocrisy of the occupation 
regime and demand respect for “ human 
rights” . It is those disparate political and 
cultural elements which form the “ Charter 
77” movement.
The Prague Spring was essentially an 
attempt to “ reform” the Soviet socialist 
model by moving towards a more democratic 
and pluralist socialism . Accordingly, 
democratic and socialist forces of East and 
West were made aware of a democratic, self­
administrating, pluralistic socialism — 
socialism with a “human face” .
The movement for “renewal of socialism” 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not purely a 
national or “ accidental” occurrence. It was 
the climax of a long crisis in socialism from 
which Stalinism had grown, and at the same 
time a tangible attempt to form a socialist 
alternative in a developed country. This was 
the real feeling o f “The Spring” and the main 
reason for Soviet intervention.
That attempt at “socialist renewal” was 
certainly not the first by any Eastern bloc 
country. One recalls the Budapest revolt and 
the “ Polish October” o f 1956, the refusal of 
Tito and Mao Tse-tung to submit to the 
dictates of Moscow. But the uniqueness of 
Czechoslovakia was that of an economically 
developed country with traditions o f 
parliamentary dem ocracy, where the 
economic basis of socialism had been laid 
after World War II, in 1945, and where the 
imposition of the Soviet model, in 1948, had 
resulted in an economic, political and
ideological crisis. It was important to see if 
socialism would give the Czechoslovakian 
people more liberty, dem ocracy and 
participation in managing society in a 
developed country — as preconceived by 
Marx and Engels — than in countries which 
had no history of parliamentary democracy 
or had come directly from feudal regimes or 
dictatorships as in Russia, China, Cuba, 
Portugal and Vietnam, without denying the 
importance of respective changes.
This was why leading bureaucratic groups 
in Moscow, Berlin and Warsaw had to stifle 
the Prague Spring on August 20, 1968. They 
were frightened by the germ of a more 
“ libertarian” socialism which could not only 
contaminate peoples o f  the Eastern 
countries, but also those of the West. The 
present leaders of the USSR have no interest 
in a “ Western” socialism which is different 
from  theirs and w h ich  m ay have 
repercussions for them in countries 
dominated by them. Hence the type of 
“ Kadarisation” imposed after August 20, 
1968 and why Czechoslovakia is still 
controlled by them 10 years later. It was to 
discourage others from following the same 
example.
August 20, 1968 was a shattering 
experience which deprived hundreds of 
thousands of citizens and 500,000 former 
communists of a political and cultural life; it 
has transformed Czechoslovakia into a 
“ Biafra of the Spirit” (Louis Aragon), and 
ensured that the Prague Spring cannot be 
easily repeated.
However, traces of the former spirit still 
remain. It is in the development of a 
“ Eurocommunism” which began with non- 
acceptance of Soviet intervention and has its 
roots in the Prague S p rin g . It is 
characterised by a more critical attitude to 
the Soviet model in the awareness that 
socialism cannot exist without democracy. 
This new approach appeals to many in the 
international left movement which has no
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clear ideology or central point of agrement, 
but represents the beginnings of a process 
which could overcome the divisions within 
workers’ movements. In fact, “ the universal 
value of democracy” (E. Berlinguer) and 
political pluralism has largely healed the 
division between “ reform ists”  and 
“revolutionaries” . The line of demarcation 
now exists between the partisans of the 
“Soviet model” and those of a “ different 
socialism” . Resolving this will take a long 
time. The Prague Spring will be the point of 
reference, like the Paris Commune has been 
to marxist revolutionaries.
Some leftwing movements, certain 
Communist parties, different radical groups 
and trade unions in Paris, Rome, Berlin, 
etc. which were more attracted by the 
romantic visions of Che Guevara, the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, by Cuba, Viet 
Nam, and later Portugal, are now 
discovering the virtues o f the less 
spectacular revolution of Czechoslovakia, 
1968, which the numerous debates and 
discussions in many countries of the world 
attest.
It could be that 1968 drew in China. Their 
disagreements with the USSR up to this time 
had been mainly ideological. The Soviet 
aggression against Czechoslovakia may 
have convinced them that they, too, may be 
faced with the menace of Soviet militarism. 
They mobilised their people and armed 
forces. They set defensive safeguards by 
approaches to the USA, to Western Europe 
and non-aligned countries (such as 
Australia) whom they previously denounced 
as “ the united objectives of American 
imperialism” . One could say that the volte- 
face of Chinese politics which had its 
theoretical expression in the “ theory of three 
worlds” (Mao Tse-tung) has its origins from 
conclusions made by the Chinese leaders 
f r o m  t h e  a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t  
Czechoslovakia, by the Soviet military.
It is paradoxical that the “ West” has not 
understood the true implications of the 
change in Chinese politics. They consider it 
to be more “ ideological” than it really is. The 
West mistakenly believes that the Chinese 
take the Czech lesson lightly, like “ an 
accident along the way” , when the opposite 
is the case.
It is true that the phenomena of political
and cultural dissidence in Eastern European 
countries existed well before the Prague 
Spring, but mainly as individual protest. In 
Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of 500,000 
from the Communist Party created a huge 
base for opposition to the occupation. For the 
majority of its participants, opposition has to 
be in secret because of the presence of the 
Soviet Army and genuine fears of reprisals. 
The hopes engendered by the “ Spring” for 
Eurocommunists and liberals of other 
Eastern European countries have aroused 
the fear of leading groups that the same 
phenomena occurring in their countries will 
lead to S ov iet repress ion  so that 
discrimination has taken place against real 
political opposition.
This atmosphere has produced “ghettos” 
of the discriminated composed of actual and 
potential dissidents, which provide new 
voices in the struggle. It is because of this 
that certain movements have come into 
being such as the “ Charter 77”  in 
Czechoslovakia; the “ Committee for Self- 
Defence”  in Poland; the “ W atchdog 
Committees of Helsinki” in the USSR, etc. 
T h e s e  m o v e m e n t s  h a v e  e x p e l l e d  
communists, socialists, christians, liberals 
and nationalists — all sharing a common 
platform which includes: the defence of free 
speech and religion, the right to strike, 
freedom of access to information, respect for 
liberty and the participation of the people in 
control of state power, all guaranteed in the 
laws and constitutions of Eastern Europe, 
but to which their leaders pay only lip 
service.
Thus, one is witnessing the birth of a 
culture parallel to the official kind as one can 
see in the various editions of “ Samizdat” in 
th e  U S S R ,  “ E d i c e  P e t l i c e ”  in 
Czechoslovakia, the literary reviews of 
Poland, Hungary, etc. None of that was 
possible before the Prague Spring which, 
even after its defeat, has shaken the myth 
and stability of the Soviet model in Eastern 
Europe.
The essential question now exists for 
Eastern Europe: what are the prospects for 
real change and will it be reform or 
revolution? Is an array of “gradual reform” 
definitely barred by the defeat of the Prague 
Spring, as the Polish philosopher Kolakorski 
insists? The answer is not easy. In the 
present situation, the chances of another
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Spring appear minimal particularly in 
‘ ‘ n o r m a l i s e d ’ ’ C z e c h o s l o v a k i a .  
Consequently, one can see nothing different 
developing — no radical tendencies to left or 
right, no phenomena o f anti-Soviet 
nationalism, not even anti-socialism. But 
there is pressure. Pressure on the 
“ Establishm ents”  o f Eastern Europe. 
Pressures especially for economic reform and 
the need to “ open” to the West. There is 
ideological cynicism  and pragmatism 
confronting the ideological rigidity of the 
party apparatus and its police, with their 
solid ties to Moscow.
The greatest fault in Dubcek’s leadership 
was to believe that one country alone could 
g o  f o r w a r d  w i t h  a p r o c e s s  o f  
democratisation, provided it did not interfere 
with foreign policy and provoke Moscow.
This belief was fostered in the illusion that 
the USSR was still  in the “ after 
Khrushchev” mood and in line with the 20th 
Congress decisions on de-stalinisation. 
Dubcek was convinced that the Soviet 
leadership would understand the importance 
of this new type of socialism for all 
communist and socialist movements and as 
such would not contemplate the use of 
military force. Because of this, nothing 
practical was done to face that menace which 
may have discouraged the Soviets from what 
they did. Czechoslovakia should have 
warned the Soviets that while faithful to the 
Warsaw Pact, they would defend themselves 
in case of aggression. They should have 
accompanied this warning by mobilising the 
army and people’s militia.
I think that this was the only way Soviet 
military intervention could have been 
avoided. This view has been confirmed by 
the examples of Tito, Mao Tse-tung and even 
Ceausescu who have not been afraid of 
risking conflict with Moscow in preserving 
their own road to socialism  without 
becoming dependent on the West.
It is an important political lesson, not only 
for opposition in Eastern Europe, but for all 
who want to build an alternate socialist 
society in all developed countries. Each 
attempt, whether in Rome, Paris or Madrid, 
is going to meet the same hostile opposition 
from the Soviet leadership. When we talk of 
this to some western communist parties they 
reproach us for pushing them into a brutal
rupture with Moscow. We do not ask this. We 
merely suggest that they be not taken by 
surprise as we were in 1968 by under­
estimating the aggressive stalinist nature of 
the present Soviet leadership, to understand 
that the socialist opposition in Eastern 
European countries is its natural ally in the 
struggle for a socialist alternative to 
capitalist society, while ruling bureaucratic 
regim es are merely brakes  on the 
development of socialism throughout the 
world.
The progress to democracy can only be 
achieved if it happens simultaneously in two 
or three Eastern European countries like 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This 
would prevent Moscow from punishing one 
country by punitive intervention like August 
20, 1968, or by making “ concessions” by the 
“ finlandisation” of Eastern Europe as the 
Polish dissident Jacek Kuron calls it. The 
possibilities of modification to socialism 
which conform with tradition and need, do 
run contrary to the essential interests of 
Soviet power in Eastern Europe.
It is for these reasons that the “ Charter 77” 
movement, other protest movements and 
“contracts” between opposition groups are 
phenomena of greatest importance to the 
future of Eastern Europe — against the 
alliance of the bureaucrats is the new 
solidarity o f the oppressed. Changes 
wrought in Eastern Europe could possibly 
provoke a political crisis in Moscow and as a 
result certain changes be effected — 
movements of national liberation often 
provoke political crises in corresponding 
metropolitan countries. This perspective is 
only possible though by international 
detente as an effort to overcome the division 
of the world into spheres of interest by the 
two super-powers.
The return to the Cold war, economic 
crises and terrorist phenomena will foster 
only authoritarian and totalitarian solutions 
of the right or left. To foster democracy in 
developed countries is to become allies in the 
fight for true socialism and against the 
status quo. That is why co-operation and 
solidarity between all socialist forces is a 
pr imordial  condi t i on  for soc ial i s t  
transformations in the world. The defence 
and development of democracy coupled with 
the rights of all humankind is an essential 
condition for progress in Eastern, as well as 
Western, countries of the world.
TECHNOLOGY & 
SOCIAL CHANGE
ERIC AARONS
“ A ustralia ’s m ost im portant resource 
is not minerals or wool — it is people  — 
people must com e before tech n ology .” *
A simple but profound statement. It is 
profound because it affirms that a principle 
other than greed for profit or the commercial 
compulsions of the market should govern 
society; because it rejects the throwing of 
hundreds o f thousands o f people on
* From full-page newspaper advertisements 
setting out policy on technological change, 
inserted by the Policy Co-ordinating Council of the 
Australian Bank Employees’ Union and the 
Commonwealth Bank Officers’ Association, 
November 15, 1978.
industrial and social scrapheaps; because it 
could well become a battle-cry in every 
industry throughout the land.
For marxists, such a statement has a 
wealth of meaning.
Marxism is not a theory of technology or a 
technological determinism, though some 
passages in the classics have such 
overtones, rsui me causes and effects of 
technological change in capitalist society are 
central questions for marxists — particularly 
the specifics of today when the pace of 
change is faster than ever, and the effects or 
potential effects far-reaching.
I propose to examine these aspects of the 
process:
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1. Its concurrence with the world capitalist 
economic crisis and the new stage of 
internationalisation of capital.
2. Its extent and depth.
3. Its occurrence at the beginnings of an 
energy, resources and ecological crisis.
* * *
1. Capitalism is an economic system which, 
unlike systems preceding it, has an inherent 
tendency to revolutionise the productive 
forces. This is because capitalism’s motive 
force is private profit: individual capitalists, 
competing in the market, can make a higher 
profit than others if they can reduce their 
costs of production below the average.
Speed up, a longer working day, below 
average  wages ,  absence  o f  union 
organisation, better organisation o f 
production and distribution, etc. can all play 
a part in this, and have done so.
But the most  i mpor tant  means  
(particularly today when some of these 
avenues are largely blocked by the strength 
of the labor movement) is the introduction of 
new equipment reducing the labor content of 
each commodity turned out, or, put in 
another way, increasing the productivity of 
labor.
The first in the field makes extra profit. But 
others are bound to follow suit or go to the 
wall in competition. This is so particularly 
because, in addition to reducing the cost per 
unit, the new facilities usually turn out a 
much larger number of units, so that supply 
increases in relation to the demand, putting 
additional price and profitability pressure on 
those retaining the old methods.
When the new equipment becomes 
standard, the extra profit is not longer to be 
made by anybody, and a new average rate of 
profit becomes established. It is now lower 
than previously because the value creating 
factor — living labor — is generally a smaller 
proportion of the total capital employed.
This is, of course, a very simplified account 
of what actually occurs, and there is 
considerable discussion in marxist circles 
today about the “ law of value” and “ the 
falling tendency of the rate of profit” . I will 
refer to some aspects of these later, but for the 
moment want to stress the dynamics of the
process. It is neither smooth nor steady. It 
takes place in bursts, and lies at the bottom of 
the boom-bust (or, euphemistically, 
“business” ) cycles which characterise 
capitalism.
Technological change goes on all the time; 
but it becomes a matter of life or death for the 
capitalist when markets are glutted, as at 
present. Some go to the wall; some old 
production facilities are taken over by 
survivors and/or dismantled; the goods in 
over-supply are gradually sold or destroyed, 
and a spate of investment in new equipment 
gets under way between the competing 
survivors. This means jobs for the 
unempl oyed in industr i es  maki ng  
equipment. They now have wages to spend, 
so consumer goods production can also 
expand and a new boom gets under way. But 
it also prepares the way for a new crash 
because, production expanding without 
plan, it eventually exceeds the purchasing 
power of the workers who receive in wages 
only a portion of the total new value they 
create.
From the point of view of a general 
understanding of the dynamics of the 
process it doesn’t matter at what point of the 
cycle one begins. But from the practical, 
political point of view it matters a great deal, 
as do all the concrete surrounding 
circumstances.
From the beginning, capitalism needed 
and created a world market, so that “ cost of 
production” of a given commodity was never 
purely national. It was its lower costs — or 
higher productivity of labor — which made 
19th century Britain the “workshop of the 
world” and gave it “ the heavy artillery with 
which it batters down all Chinese walls” 
(Communist Manifesto j, excluding its goods 
both from feudal countries and other 
capitalist countries, though tariff and other 
barriers were continually being set up to 
exclude them and allow indigenous industry 
to develop. (It was behind tariff barriers that 
Australian m anufacturing industry 
developed, especially after tbe two world 
wars.)
Today, the internationalisation o f 
production and the market, especially per 
medium of the multinational corporations, is 
ever so much more advanced, generating 
great pressures on the industries of each
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country to fit into a new “ international 
d iv i s ion o f  l a b o r ”  adapted to the 
requirements  o f  the mul t inat i onal  
corporations and the new technology 
controlled by them.
Such new phenomena as the “ global car” , 
assembled from components made with the 
very latest techniques in many countries, is 
an example of the kind of almost irresistible 
economic pressures to which the car industry 
in separate countries is subjected — with 
politics, skulduggery and inter-nation and 
inter-multinational corporation rivalry also 
coming into it.
Mr. Lynch  recent ly  warned that 
“ integration of the Australian vehicle and 
component industry into the world car
concept would be essential....  ” (Financial
Review, November 10, 1978.)
So, today, in Australia, as well as other 
countries, the “normal” pressures for 
introduction of new technology merge with 
pressures from the “ international market” to 
remove tariff barriers, to abandon whole 
industries or drastically curtail them to one 
or two more efficient operators, to move 
“offshore” to take advantage of low-paid, un­
unionised labor, and to transfer capital into 
the energy and raw material resource areas 
where higher rates of profit are being 
obtained in very capital-intensive processes.
The Liberal and National Country Parties 
naturally bow to the pressures — or, rather, 
ally with them, though with an eye to the 
political costs, traditional sectional-class 
alliances, etc. with the crudest outcome in the 
resource-richest states of Queensland and 
Western Australia. (See L. Aarons, “The 
Conservative Crisis” , Tribune, November 8, 
1975.)
But the dominant centre-right in the trade 
unions and the Labor Party — traditionally 
champions of “ Australian manufacturing”
— are also succumbing on the grounds of 
“realism” , and not even attempting to 
formulate an alternative perspective.
This places extra responsibility on the left, 
with corresponding opportunities for 
increasing its mass support. Solutions are 
not simple, economically or politically. Even 
were socialists to be running Australia 
tomorrow, it would not be self-evident what 
should be done with the car industry, 
whitegoods, ship-building, transport, etc. A
lot of homework has to be done, and, indeed, 
is getting under way in a number of quarters, 
including the CPA. Nor is unity about a 
suitable approach easy to achieve politically, 
because all the changes are not felt equally 
by all sections of the workforce — some may 
even gain in a very narrow sense from the 
process.
But, to give into or go along with 
international market pressures really means 
giving into or going along with the 
multinational corporations who dominate in 
that market, with increasingly harmful 
consequences.
Big corporations don’t care about the 
effects of asbestos and other substances on 
the workers they employ, and even hide the 
facts. They will destroy Jarrah forests for 
bauxite and put Perth’s water supply in 
jeopardy. They will support any regime, 
however oppressive (e.g. The Shah of 
Persia’s) if it suits their interests. They will 
charge into the uncharted nuclear future, 
destroy whole industries, and condemn 
mi l l i ons  to unempl oyment  wi thout  
compunction. How can anything good come 
from succumbing to market forces which 
express their dominance?
The guiding principle o f an alternative is 
given in the banking unions’ advertisement, 
which is along similar lines to the approach 
adopted earlier by the Telecom workers: 
putting people first, recognising them and 
their actual and potential skills as the main 
wealth of the country. This means putting 
people’s needs before multinational 
corporation ones. It means putting social 
needs before private (profit) ones. It means 
identifying such interests as those of 
Australia as a nation. Notin isolation, but in 
co-operation with working class forces 
everywhere, with national liberation and 
other movements struggling for a new world 
economic order in which multinational 
corporations’ interests do not dominate.
* * *
2. The present spate of technological 
innovation comes on top of an already high 
productivity o f labor, giving rise to 
qualitative as well as quantitative effects.
This can be seen first of all in the 
u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  a u t o m a t i o n  and  
computerisation. While not yet complete, nor
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likely to be in the foreseeable future, this is 
now happening in areas which were formerly 
largely untouched — banking, secretarial 
work, medical diagnosis, warehousing, etc. 
In principle, computers could have been used 
in these fields earlier, but it was not an 
econom ic proposition until computers 
b e c a m e  m o r e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and  
miniaturised, with a drastic reduction in 
cost. The fact that the new generation of 
computers came on stream at the same time 
as the economic crisis is largely contingent, 
but it certainly intensifies the problems.
Thus, some sections of the working class 
which formerly were, or felt themselves to be, 
privileged, have found both their status and 
their employment undermined.This and 
other changes in their work have brought 
them closer to the more traditional “ labor 
m ovem ent”  forces, reflected in the 
development o f their union organisation and 
moves for amalgamation with the ACTU. 
This helps counterbalance the tendency to 
segmentation of the workforce which is such 
a feature of modern economies.
It also knocks on the head the fond hopes 
so often expressed in palmier days that 
expansion in the tertiary sector would more 
t h a n  m a k e  up f o r  j o b  l o s s e s  in 
manufacturing.
The increasing integration of science and 
production (discussed further below), and 
further mechanisation up to automation and 
computerisation have complex consequences 
for the labor process. Contrary to some 
earlier predictions or hopes, however, it 
seems that the overall result is a general 
downgrading rather than upgrading of 
skills, though the latter also takes place.
Harry Braverman in Labor and Monopoly 
Capital comments savagely:
Since, with the developm ent o f  
technology and the application to it of 
the fundamental sciences, the labor 
processes of society have come to 
embody a greater amount of scientific 
knowledge, clearly the ‘a vera ge ’ 
scientific, technical, and in that sense 
‘skill’ content o f these labor processes is 
much greater now than in the past. But 
this is nothing but a tautology. The 
question is precisely whether the
scientific and ‘educated’ content o f labor 
tends towards averaging , or, on the 
contrary, towards polarisation. If the 
latter is the case, to then say that the 
‘average’ skill has been raised is to adopt 
the logic o f the statistician who, with one 
foot in the fire and the other in ice water, 
will tell you that ‘on the average’ he is 
perfectly comfotable. The mass of 
workers gain nothing from the fact that 
the decline in their command over the 
labor process is more than compensated 
for by the increasing command on the 
part of managers and engineers. On the 
contrary, not only does their skill fall in 
an absolute sense (in that they lost craft 
and traditional abilities without gaining 
new abilities adequate to compensate the 
loss), but it falls even more in a relative 
sense. The more science is incorporated 
into the labor process, the less the worker 
understands o f the process; the more 
sophisticated an intellectual product the 
machine becomes, the less control and 
comprehension of the machine the 
worker has. In other words, the more the 
worker needs to know in order to remain 
a human being at work, the less does he 
or she know. This is the chasm which the 
notion of ‘average skill’ conceals, (page 
425.)
This poses considerable problems for 
socialists because such a polarisation of 
skills and know-how, while not a “ class” 
division in itself, could not but reinforce 
tendencies to hierarchical structures and the 
strengthening of bureaucratic and state 
control which, for a number of other reasons 
as well, have so far bedevilled societies where 
capitalism has been overthrown.
Other aspects of much new technology, 
including the opportunities it gives for 
surveillance, compilation of dossiers and 
monopolising information, act in the same 
direction.
Nevertheless, the potentialities for new 
solutions are also created. Greatly reduced 
hours of work can give not only more leisure 
and recreation in traditional forms, but also 
the possibility for continued learning 
throughout life (a trend already growing as 
seen in the increase in the number of “ mature 
age” students) which, in turn, would help 
enable  a shar i ng  and rotat i on o f  
responsibilities and occupations. We are
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egalitarians here, too. Not in thinking that 
everyone has the same abilities or interests, 
but in wanting to ensure that all have equal 
opportunities to develop their talents and 
participate in creative work of their choice, 
as well as sharing the “ shit work” .
This would best be achieved by “ workers’ 
control” at all level%and particularly at the 
“workface” itself with small work groups 
mutually controlling and sharing, at least to 
a certain extent, jobs embodying varying 
levels of skill and knowledge.
Such possibilities extend to general social 
labor, including responsibility for helping 
with child care and upbringing, furthering 
the liberation of women and providing 
opportunities for socially meaningful work 
for the young and for the aged, now so often 
virtual outcasts in our society.
So putting people before profits, minerals 
and wool, not only means considering job 
opportunities, but also considering the 
nature of those jobs and of the control over 
the work process.
These are of course political and social
issues, to be resolved by political and social 
struggle, the outcome of which is not pre­
ordained. It could result in the unemployed 
being put into a ghetto, ignored and even 
vilified by the employed (as “ dok; bludgers” , 
etc.), and in those privileged in knowledge 
and control forming an elite separated from 
the mass of workers. Or it could result in a 
new, socialist society.
The Law of Value
But the scope of the social consequences 
flowing from a high level o f technological 
development go further yet, as we can see by 
asking an apparently unrelated question: if 
capital intensity is increased, even to the 
point of complete automation, dispensing 
with virtually all direct labor, how can any 
profit be made since, according to the labor 
theory of value, only labor can add new value 
in the production process?
At one level this is easy to answer. 
Outlining the process by which the rate of 
profit is averaged out between different 
industries with different capital intensities 
(different “organic compositions” of capital), 
different times of turnover etc, Marx pointed 
out that the working class as a whole is
exploited by the capitalist class as a whole. 
This takes the form of the total surplus value 
produced being divided up among the 
capitalists not in accordance with the 
number of workers they employed or the 
money laid out in wages, but in accordance 
with the total capital they had invested.
Thus, if one branch of industry had one 
tenth of the total social capital invested in it, 
it would get one tenth of the total surplus 
value produced even if it employed only one 
hundredth of the workers.
Why would that be so? The reasoning was 
the same as in the initial form of the labor 
theory of value, based on the fact that in 
“ simple commodity production”  the 
equipment etc involved could be regarded as 
minimal in comparison with the labor. The 
theory says that the value of a commodity is 
equal to the number of hours of socially 
necessary labor time spent in its production.
In a society where there is no social plan 
because private ownership divides people, 
yet there is a social division of labor and 
universal exchange of the necessities of life 
in the form of commodities, there had to be, 
Marx said, a mechanism by which was 
established the necessary quantitative 
division of total social labor to give the “ mix” 
of commodities required by society. The labor 
theory of value was the theoretical 
expression or “ law” of this mechanism.
Similarly, where constant capital is, 
quantitatively, of as great or greater weight 
in production than variable capital, there 
has to be a mechanism by which both 
equipment etc and labor are distributed 
among  di f ferent  industr ies in the 
proportions required to provide the 
necessary mix o f commodities. This 
mechanism was the “ average rate of profit” , 
set out by Marx in the third volume of 
Capital.
Monopoly, state intervention and other 
factors or course altered the situation in both 
the initial and modified forms of the “ law of 
value” . But one of Marx’s strengths was that 
he could disclose the underlying necessary 
mechanism which was not dependent on the 
particular vagaries of such modifying 
influences. If some of his followers equate 
these highly abstract “ laws” with a specific 
economic reality, that is their weakness, not 
Marx’s.
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But what if all production were to be 
automated? (Though this is highly unlikely, 
there is no doubt that development is in this 
direction, so the question is valid in the 
theoretical sense.)
Marx himself, in a remarkable example of 
prevision based on his general analysis, 
foresaw that a time would come when the 
development of the productive forces had 
reached a point where the main factor was 
no longer direct labor in the actual 
production process, but rather the general 
level o f human knowledge and its 
application, and the force arising from social 
combination:
...to the degree that large industry 
develops, the creation o f real wealth 
comes to depend less on labor time and 
on the amount o f labor employed thanon 
the power o f the agencies set in motion 
during labor time, whose ‘powerful 
e ffec tiv en ess ’ is itself out o f  all 
proportion to the direct labor time spent 
on their production, but depends rather 
on the general state o f science and on the 
p ro g ress  o f  te c h n o lo g y , or the  
a p p lica tion  o f  th is s c ien ce  to 
production .... (Grundrisse, pp. 704-5). 
And
...direct labor and its quantity disappear 
as the determ inant principle o f  
production...com pared to general 
s c ie n t i f ic  labor, te c h n o lo g ica l  
application of natural sciences, on one 
side, and to the general productive forces 
arising from social combination in total 
production on the other side... (ibid, p. 
700).*
This speaks against conceptions which 
narrow the definition of productive labor and 
“class” , but more importantly indicates that 
many “ tertiary” and “ service” areas, 
particularly those in which the state has
* Braverman nas this to say:
The scientific-technical revolution ... cannot 
be understood in terms o f specific innovations
— as in the case o f the Industrial Revolution, 
which may he adequately characterised by a 
handful o f key inventions — but must be 
understood rather in its totality as a mode of 
production into which science and exhaustive 
engineering investigations have been 
integrated as part o f ordinary functioning. 
(Labor and Monopoly Capital, pp. 166-7.)
increasingly intervened during this century 
and especially since the Second World War, 
are not accidental or just ideologically 
motivated, but are to one degree or another 
necessary for production itself. This also 
helps to explain why, despite accolades to 
Milton Friedman and Co. because of their 
opposition to government intervention, and 
the genuine wish (as I take it to be) of the 
Fraser and other governments to reduce 
theirs, it still continues or even increases.
There are, of course, still market forces. But 
these cannot make capitalism run efficiently 
even in the narrow economic sense, let alone 
solve problems of chronic unemployment, 
inflation, cultural degradation etc, or 
achieve ecological harmony or ensure a 
continuous supply in the future of relatively 
cheap energy.
Marx draws some further theoretical 
conclusions:
As soon as labor in the direct form has 
ceased to be the great well-spring of 
wealthy labor time ceases, and must 
cease to be its measure. (Grundrisse, p. 
705.)
We have therefore, in a sense, the 
beginnings of the abolition of the labor 
measure of value as an economic regulator 
within capitalism itself, with all the 
tensions and contradictions that generates 
economically and socially for the system:
Capital thus works towards its own 
dissolution as the form dominating 
production, (ibid, p. 700.)
The problem arising from the current wave 
of automation and computerisation are an 
expression of the “dissolution” of capitalism; 
the energy crisis is another. Of course, the 
“dissolution” is not automatic or inevitable. 
Rather, more and more situations are created 
which, given active intervention and 
forward-looking vision by progressive social 
forces, can open up the possibilities of a 
transition towards socialism.
If labor time spent directly in production is 
no longer the measure of wealth, what is? 
According to Marx free time:
...real wealth is the developed productive 
power of all individuals. The measure of 
wealth is then (when the above changes 
have proceeded far enough — E.A.) not
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any longer, in any way, labor time, but 
rather disposable time. Labor time as 
the measure of value posits wealth 
itself as founded in poverty... (ibid, p. 
708.)
“ Universality” characterises the direction 
of development under capitalism, however 
uneven and distorted the actual development 
may be:
...creating) the material elements for the 
development o f the rich individuality 
which is as all-sided in its production as 
in its consum ption, and the full 
development o f activity itself, in which 
natural necessity in its direct form has 
disappeared because a historically 
created need has taken the place o f a 
natural one. (ibid, p. 325.)
Thus the possibility and need today is to 
recognise that “ the absolute elaboration of 
(humanity’s) creative dispositions, without 
any preconditions other than antecedent 
historical evolution which makes the totality 
of this evolution — that is, the evolution of all 
human powers as such, unmeasured by any 
previously established yardstick — an 
end in itself’ Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic 
Formations, E. Hobsbawm ed., pp. 84-85).
These needs and possibilities are modified 
not only by capitalist and specifically MNC 
distortion, but also by the world situation in 
which the great majority of the world’s 
population still suffers material deprivation, 
and where the energy crisis (etc) add a ne v 
economic factor. Nevertheless, “ people 
before profits” and “ social before private 
needs” is in various ways not only an 
approach attractive in itself, but also one 
becoming increasingly necessary to 
effectively grapple with today’s problems in 
advanced economies.
* * *
3. The looming energy crisis is dealt with 
extensively in the article by Barry 
Commoner also published in this issue, and I 
only want to emphasise some aspects.
First, there is an energy crisis which, for 
the next 10 to 20 years is likely to be 
manifested in a continually rising price for 
energy, not an absolute shortage. In the 
longer term, the costs will escalate so rapidly 
as to be almost equivalent to an absolute 
shortage, unless a change is made to
renewable sources as the major source of 
supply.
It may be that this time is scores of years 
away, and therefore unlikely to readily 
motivate masses of people. But socialists 
must  look ahead.  And cer ta inly  a 
commercial, profit-measured approach 
cannot even begin to tackle such a problem in 
either short or long term because it lacks the 
dimension of social consideration, of 
planning for social needs — even within one 
country, let alone globally.
The fact that wealth depends on nature — 
on the land, the waters, the minerals, the 
flora and fauna — as well as on human labor, 
is evident enough. But, while recognising 
this, marxists have paid by far the greatest 
attention to the dynamics of social systems 
“under their own steam” as it were, with 
nature in the (sometimes very distant) 
background.
Even earl ier  soc iet ies  somet imes  
qualitatively affected the ecology — from the 
periodical burnings off by Aborigines in 
Australia to the denudation of forests in 
China, the rising salinity and/or silting up of 
irrigation systems in the Middle East and (it 
has been said) the decline of Carthage 
because of the depredations of the goats.
Nevertheless, today ’s situation is 
qualitatively different both in its scope and 
the rapidity with which ecological crises are 
likely to descend upon us. Who would have 
thought  that  a huge sea l ike the 
Mediterranean could be critically polluted or 
the Murray river system endangered in so 
short a time?
In the energy field it is in the next 10 or 20 
years that the trend is likely to be settled (for 
example ,  with nuc lear  power  and 
irremediable depletion of oil reserves), 
reducing the options for alternatives.
One very revealing fact in Commoner’s 
article is that the oil companies had already, 
before the OPEC decision, arrived at the 
conclusion they would have to greatly 
increase prices to maintain their rate of 
profit for the future, in light of the costs of 
discovering, extracting, refining and 
transporting the volume of oil it was 
projected would be needed on the then 
existing trends (which haven’t changed 
much since).
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No doubt this was in part pure greed. But it 
also represented a real response to the energy 
problem, especially the enormous capital 
expenditures required. The amount of 
“ constant capital" required in some fields — 
e.g., with the present generation o f 
computers — may be radically reduced, thus 
even “ freeing” capital and boosting the rate 
of profit. But the energy field shows very 
much the opposite development, and it is 
hard to see this radically changing. 
Commoner discusses the likely economic 
effects of this and the escalating cost of 
energy which can at the most be delayed a 
short time by the opening up of new oil fields
— even o f “ Middle East size” as the Mexican 
fields are said to be.
Even if the “ law of value” were not 
declining in power as an economic regulator 
for the reasons adduced earlier, there is no 
means by which the depletion of a resource 
can be taken into account by purely economic 
and accounting criteria (in fact taxation 
measures tend to compensate mining 
companies the more generously the quicker 
they exhaust their mine). Direct social 
intervention is necessary with quite other 
than capitalist and profit considerations to 
the fore. The oil companies — now spreading 
their tentacles over the whole energy field — 
are incapable of doing this, as well as being 
unwilling.
Similarly, as Commoner also points out, 
the energy-intensity (as well as the 
capital- and labor-intensity) of every form of 
production, transport etc must be taken into 
account (not every piece of new technology is 
to be welcomed). And the only way, as he 
says, in which capitalism can take energy- 
intensity into account is by continually 
escalating the price and so intensifying 
social inequalities, because it won’t hurt the 
rich.
As to the ecological consequences, the 
mining companies are f ighting back 
strongly, and even going onto the offensive. 
A recent article says:
The antagonism o f the US mining 
industry to governmental regulations, 
e sp e c ia lly  th ose  d ea lin g  with  
environmental controls, has reached 
such a pitch that one industry leader, Mr 
Charles Barber, chairman o f Asarco, a 
major minerals group, and vice- 
chairman o f the American Mining
C on g ress , has been  driven  to 
apocalyptic comment.
‘Unless something changes 10 or 20 
years from now our mineral industry will 
have disappeared’, he said.
It is the cost o f conforming to the 
regulations, especially at a time of 
depressed market prices for many 
minerals, which is the basis o f industry 
complaints and fears that it will lose its 
competitiveness in the face o f cheaper 
overseas products. (Financial Review, 
November 15, 1978.)
The article reports that the Carter 
administration is bowing to the companies’ 
demands on the grounds of “ combating 
inflation” . Could we expect the Fraser 
government, basing their whole strategy on 
inducing multinational capital to mine in 
Australia, to lag behind?
But, in focussing the opposition on the 
present government and the MNCs, we 
should not forget, either, Commoner’s 
warning that social rather than commercial 
decision is, while necessary, “not (a) 
sufficient condition for maximising social 
welfare” . Social decision must also be guided 
by a far-seeing policy, which is not notably 
present so far in countries where capitalism 
has been overthrown.
Battlelines are being drawn in what will be 
a continuing and intensifying struggle 
between capi tal i sts  and capi tal i s t  
governments, and working class and other 
progressive social forces. It is a crucial 
struggle for humanity,  in which the 
favorabl e  outcome is pro f oundl y  
revolutionary, socially as well as politically.
One does not expect that the majority of 
bank employees or the Telecom workers, in 
the steps of whose victory they follow, would 
be convinced socialists. But, being forced to 
face up to crucial issues as they proceed, they 
will, hopefully, develop their consciousness, 
which will be a crucial factor in the ongoing 
struggle. But, in another sense, the fact that 
they pose such radical measures arising 
directly from their own grassroots situation, 
shows how deep the issue o f technological 
change goes.
This gives grounds for optimism about 
future developments, however great the 
difficulties. □
THE NICARAGUAN
EVENTS
Interview with Tim Harding, Professor of History at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, and Co-editor o f  Latin American Perspectives.
The Somoza regime
The Somoza regime is a dynasty in the 
sense that it is an hereditary regime. It 
started with Anastasio Somoza Del Bila, the 
father of the current president of Nicaragua, 
and he came into power in 1936. First he was 
commander of the National Guard of 
Nicaragua and from that position he burst 
his way into the presidency through a 
military manoeuvre. His rise to the head of 
the National Guard had been as a result of 
US military intervention. The United States 
intervened repeatedly in Nicaragua, sending 
marines and the army between the turn of 
the century, 1900, and their final withdrawal 
of troops in 1933. The second and most 
prolonged invasion of Nicaragua was 
between 1927 and 1933. The US intervened in 
a dispute between two factions of the upper 
class in Nicaragua and tried to impose a 
solution on the two factions. One military 
leader of the Liberal Party refused to accept 
that imposition, and that leader was 
Augusto Caesar Sandino.
What happened then was that Sandino 
started a guerilla war against the United 
States and it lasted from 1927 until 1933. By 
1933 Sandino had actually defeated the US 
military, which was very significant in 
many ways. Firstly, it was the first major 
struggle  o f  US mi l i tary  aga i nst  a 
revolutionary insurgency force and some of 
the commanders who got their first combat 
experience in Nicaragua later on played
commanding roles in World War 2, and the 
Korean war. For instance, Matthew 
Ri dgeworth  who was the mi l i tary 
commander in Korea got his first combat 
experience as an officer in Nicaragua. The 
US were unable to defeat Sandino. The more 
troops they sent in, the more the revolution 
spread and became a national liberation 
struggle that reached out throughout the 
hemisphere and throughout the world. There 
were meetings against US intervention in 
Europe, in the United States, and throughout 
Latin America. President Calles of Mexico 
denounced the United States opposition in 
Nicaragua. For a variety of political as well 
as military reasons, and for international 
strategic reasons, the United States decided 
to pull out of Nicaragua. Hoover, who was 
president at the time, decided the best thing 
to do was to get out while he still could.
The United States between 1930 and 1933 
concentrated on creating an armed force in 
Nicaragua called the National Guard which 
replaced the army and the police. It was both 
an army and a police force. The head of the 
National Guard was selected by the US and 
it was Anastasio Somoza. He was chosen 
partly because he was the dancing instructor 
of the US ambassador’s wife. So when the US 
withdrew, Sandino, as he had promised, said 
that this was a basis for negotiation and his 
troops stopped fighting and came to an 
agreement with the National Guard once the 
US had withdrawn and there was a 
transitional regime. During this transition,
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Sandino came into the capital city of 
Managua several times and on one of these 
visits he was picked up by a patrol of the 
National Guard and he and three of his top 
commanders were driven out to the airport 
on the outskirts of the city and murdered. 
Within two years Somoza had become 
president and ever since then (1936) the 
Somozas have ruled Nicaragua.
When the older Somoza died, power passed 
to the older son Louise. He died of a heart 
attack and was succeeded by Anastasio 
Somoza junior, the current president. To 
complete the dynasty, two Somozas wait on 
the wings: one is Jose Somoza, half-brother 
to the president, born out of wedlock, who 
was apparently illiterate until a few years 
ago when the dynasty felt that they had 
better educate him because he may have to 
take over. The other is the son of the present 
president, also Anastasio, grandson of the 
first Somoza. He is only 27, and considered 
too young to run the country. They might 
need Jose in case Somoza dies of heart 
disease because he had an attack about l'/i 
years ago. He is still not well but he’s still 
promoting vigorous repression. His son 
Anastasio and his half-brother are both 
military officials in the National Guard and 
they both occupy strategic positions.
So in a way, the thing that brought about 
the current crisis is a crisis of succession, a 
question o f what happens if this Somoza dies
— Who is going to succeed him, and what 
guarantees does the ruling class have for 
survival if the dynasty is broken? This is one 
of the things that have led to the opposition 
organizing.
The nature of the Somoza regime
It’s probably the vigorous survival of the 
old-style dictatorship, controlled by the US 
and oriented to the export of products to the 
United States, paying virtually no attention 
to the development of the internal economy. 
Coffee, cotton, gold, bananas, cattle and 
minerals are produced. Meat is grown by 
extensive methods for export as low grade 
meat to the United States for pet food.
The ruling class
Traditionally the ruling class was 
formally divided into two factions, the 
Liberals and the Conservatives. The 
Conservatives were oriented towards Great
Britain but Great Britain lost control of 
Nicaragua around the turn of the century. 
The Liberals were oriented towards the US 
and Somoza is a Liberal. Both factions were 
oriented towards export agriculture but had 
their base of power in different regions. Leon 
and Granada were Conservative areas. 
Managua, the capital, is the Liberal centre of 
power. The Conservatives because they were 
pro-British, and because the British were 
eclipsed by the US, have played a kind of 
national opposition to the complete sellout to 
US interests that the Liberals symbolised.
The thing that the Somoza regime has 
been able to do is to monopolize all the 
wealth-producing activities in one clan. It’s 
not just the Somoza family but it’s the family 
plus those capitalists and pre-capitalist 
landowners clustered around Somoza in 
partnership, and licence agreements and 
favoritism from the State that give them a 
personal common interest, that ties them 
together with Somoza. On top of that, the 
National Guard has an economic role in the 
sense that National Guard officers and even 
non-commissioned officers are encouraged to 
engage in a whole range of illegal activities 
which undercut State financing. For 
instance, ,they have contraband imports and 
exports without paying taxes and they are 
immune from criminal prosecution because 
they are in the Guard and, even though their 
salaries are not fantasically high, they are 
encouraged to engage in irregular economic 
activities which depend on the favoritism of 
the State which binds them to the Somoza 
regime because they know if the Somoza 
regime goes down they have to answer for it.
Social relations in the countryside
There has been virtually no capital 
investment in the countryside. It’s primitive 
extraction and pre-capitalist in the sense 
t h a t  ther e  are m o s t l y  n o n - w a g e  
relationships. The coffee work is done by 
people who are coerced to come into it 
because the land that they live on is too small 
to survive on so they move into seasonal 
coffee labour and basically work on credit. 
They are working off credit that they have 
already accumulated before they were born. 
It’s very backward in terms of production, 
it’s very labour-intensive.
One characteristic o f Nicaraguan 
agriculture is the abundance of land and the
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relative shortage of labour. There are 
extensive areas o f uncultivated land, said to 
be held by the Somoza family or held by the 
State for transfer to Somoza, which are now 
being developed for the first time with a 
certain amount of capital investment. In 
other words, it’s cattle and lumber. Therefore 
there are no machines coming in. The most 
profitable productive agricultural land and 
real estate land is owned by the Somoza clan. 
Also the companies outside the agricultural 
sector are owned by the Somoza group. For 
instance, cement. They own the banking 
industry outside the foreign banks. They 
own the second largest newspaper, the other 
is owned by the Conservative opposition. 
They own food processing and control the 
key export products.
The rest of the upper class has suffered 
from the fact that you had to be either with 
the Somozas or be driven into bankruptcy. 
However, until the 1972 earthquake when the 
Somoza group moved against private capital 
in several areas, other capitalist groups had 
been able to thrive without interference from 
the State or the Somozas. That was in 
housing, public works and in certain 
bank i ng  areas.  As a result  o f  the 
reconstruction after the earthquake, the 
funnelling of all foreign aid to Nicaragua for 
earthquake relief went through the Somoza 
group. On top of that, instead of rebuilding 
the centre of the city of Managua, they 
decentralised it and rebuilt it on the 
outskirts, where there had just been slums 
before. The outskirts properties were owned 
and controlled by the Somozas so they 
profited personally in the development of 
those areas and prof i ted from the 
construction. From then on you heard more 
and more complaints from groups in the 
upper class. There’s no way they can get a 
living without getting rid of Somoza. He has 
cut off all possibilities of expansion of the 
capitalist groups clustered around the State.
In an uneasy but uncompetitive way, they 
are beginning to get wiped out. This is why 
the business groups claim that they have 
started to become more active against 
Somoza. There is no room left for them to act. 
Then in 1974 you had the kidnapping of 
several high government officials by the 
Sandinistas who, in return for the freeing of 
some prisoners, went to Cuba with their 
hostages. Then in 1977 there was an attack 
on San Carlos on the Costa Rican border.
This was designed to touch off a general 
insurrection. It failed. The next event was in 
January 1978 when Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro, editor of the opposition paper, 
was killed. He was a prominent figure in the 
Conservative party. That event set off the 
general strike or general lockout by business 
groups later on in January 1978. Then in 
July, the Group of Twelve returned to 
Nicaragua. In August the business groups 
started another lockout in close co-operation 
with the labour movement who called a 
general strike. Later in August, the 
kidnapping took place in the National 
Palace, and the general civil war followed in 
September.
Human rights and repression
There is a variety of repression that the 
regime uses. For instance, there has been a 
cont inual  i mpr i son i ng  o f  pol i t i cal  
opposition, accompanied by torture, and this 
is particularly directed against people 
involved in radical labour organising and 
peasant organising and opposition in the 
middle class. There is a whole history going 
back to 1936 of political prisoners, torture, 
repression. In addition to that there has been 
only a few moments in Nicaragua when 
there has been even a minimum freedom of 
the press. During most of the dynasty there 
has been no freedom of the press, only once in 
a while usually under pressure from the 
United States to bring about minimum 
democratization to justify US support for the 
dynasty. So that at various times there has 
been rigged presidential elections combined 
with limited freedom of the press which 
usually was taken advantage of  by 
Chamorro’s newspaper, which would print 
information about corruption of the regime 
and violation of human rights. In December 
1977 a slight opening up of freedom of the 
press was allowed under pressure from the 
US government and it was at that time 
that Chamorro ’s newspaper printed 
information of the blood scandal.
The blood scandal was a partnership 
between Somoza and a Cuban exile to export 
blood from Nicaragua. It was a scandal, so 
when the information came out the Cuban 
involved went to the US to avoid prosecution 
in Nicaragua.  Shortly afterwards, in 
January, Chamorro was murdered. When 
the Nicaraguan government investigated 
the murder they came up with people said to
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be responsible for it. They had been 
contracted by an executive of the blood 
company. I don’t know whether they did it, 
nobody knows, but even the officia l 
explanation is particularly damning.
In terms o f the constant military actions 
against the guerilla movement, there has 
been very widespread repression of the 
peasantry, in the north-east of Nicaragua 
particularly. Here, whole villages have been 
relocated, peasants taken up in helicopters 
and dropped out, being killed and 
interrogated that way. The National Guard 
regularly pillaged and raped women in 
villages in ways parallel to the things that 
happened in Vietnam, under advice from 
those who had experience in Vietnam. 
Somoza until two months ago refused to 
allow Human Rights organisations into 
Nicaragua to inspect on the spot. Recently, 
under US pressure, he said that the UN 
Commission on Human Rights could come to 
Nicaragua at some future date which has 
never been established.
The United States, particularly under 
President Carter, has been under pressure to 
show that they really have a Human Rights 
policy in relation to countries like Nicaragua 
which have always been US fiefdoms. That 
has led to a very contradictory public policy 
toward Nicaragua in which the State 
Department and the White House have 
argued with each other about what the 
attitude should be and what the realities of 
Human Rights are in Nicaragua. In April- 
June this year the presidency came out and 
said that since Nicaragua had improved its 
stance on Human Rights, US aid to 
Nicaragua would be released (not military 
aid; they claimed that they had ended 
mi l i tary  aid) .  That  was  fo l l owed 
immediately by a statement from the State 
Department that there had been no 
improvement in Human Rights and they 
advised against the release of the aid. So 
there are contradictions. In the Congress 
there is a strong pro-Somoza group, one of 
them was Somoza’s classmate at West Point. 
They say that Somoza is the only one 
fighting communism in Latin America. On 
the other hand, a number of Liberal senators 
are opposed to US aid and are responsive to 
the campaigns in the US to cut off aid to 
Nicaragua. They have been trying to 
determine to what extent aid is continuing 
secretly and to what extent the US advisers,
who, according to Somoza, are “ contracted 
by the Nicaraguan government, but separate 
from US aid” , are CIA and to what extent 
they are just mercenaries.
Pressure on Somoza
The easiest pressure to document is the 
pressure on Somoza to change, which is 
combined with a preparation of alternatives. 
The main thrust of US policy has been to let 
the National Guard remain in power as the 
controller of property rights. That’s the 
principal thing they want and whether 
Somoza stays in power is negotiable. One of 
the reasons the US has not already 
abandoned Somoza, or even arranged for his 
assassination, is because of the pressure in 
the US around the whole question of CIA 
assassinations and interventions. It would 
be the occasion of a major investigation if 
Somoza were assassinated and if there was 
any evidence of US involvement. This has 
given the CIA a certain inability to 
manoeuvre as it ordinarily would.
Secondly, the pressure on Somoza to 
change is clearly in terms of military and 
economic aid to Nicaragua being blocked. To 
the extent that Somoza has been willing to 
allow freedom of the press, to drop charges 
against “ the Twelve” so they could return to 
Nicaragua (this clearly under US pressure), 
to talk about an election campaign and that 
then the presidency would be open for 
struggle between upper class groups, and to 
give rights to people to campaign, in order to 
liberalise the regime before it was 
overthrown, this is clearly the US tactic.
The US has very definitely been in contact 
with business opposition groups and people 
are even promoting the head of INDE (a 
business group) as the possible head of a 
transitional government, once Somoza is 
overthrown. The US would be happy with 
that sort of person and there is no question 
that the business groups when opposing 
Somoza speak as much as to the State 
Department as to the Nicaraguan public 
because their feeling is that the key to 
changeover in power is having a guarantee 
from the US for a moderate opposition. If 
they can get that backing and if they can get 
the US to force Somoza to resign, then they 
can move into power without having the 
guerillas defeat the National Guard and that 
means the Guard stays. That’s definitely 
what’s happening behind the scenes.
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Opposition groups
There were two opposition groups to the 
Somozas in the late 30s, 40s and 50s: The 
Conservative party, a faction of the upper 
class, of which the most vocal (in the 
opposi t i on)  was C h a m o r r o ’ s paper 
expressing moderate opposition around 
democratic rights, freedom of speech. The 
other opposition was the remnants of the 
Sandini sta  movement  whi ch  went  
underground in 1936 and almost ceased to 
exist and sort o f became a latent folklore 
opposition between the early 40s and 1962. 
But there still were Sandinistas, a small 
number in the countryside and the small 
towns who had engaged in resistance. In 
1954 there was a student-led guerilla 
movement which attempted to overthrow the 
Somozas and there was a muted civil war for 
about a year, large numbers of people were 
killed, a lot of student leaders were killed. 
One of the people involved as an armed 
revolutionary was Ernesto Cardenal, a poet 
now very prominent in Latin America. At 
that time he was a student revolutionary; 
subsequent to the defeat of the rebellion he 
became a priest and was influenced by 
Catholic mystics and returned to Nicaragua 
and set up a utopian community on an island 
in Lake Nicaragua. From that base he began 
to write popular radical poetry. His island 
was like an island of sanity in’ a land of 
repression. He became more and more vocal 
until last year when he went on a world 
speaki ng  tour,  r ead i ng  his poetry,  
denouncing the Somoza regime. All his 
poems deal with repression, even his poem on 
Marilyn Monroe was a denunciation of US 
culture in Nicaragua. So when he was out of 
Nicaragua, the National Guard destroyed 
the whole community on the island and 
killed many of the peasants who were 
organized into co-operatives, and destroyed 
it as an insult to the Nicaraguan regime. 
The Sandinistas
The Sandinistas became an organized 
movement again in 1962 and the base was 
mainly radical middle class students who 
went into the countryside and set up a 
guerilla focal along Fidelista lines. In fact it 
was classical Fidelista as interpreted by 
radical middle class students. At that time 
the labour movement was largely under the 
Nicaraguan Socialist party (PSN), which 
was the communist party. Ever since the 
early 40s the communists had been the main
force in the labour movement. The labour 
movement was relatively small because they 
didn't have a manufacturing sector, but after 
WW2 there was a growth of light industry, 
plastic, food processing and a little import 
substitution. There was no heavy industry, 
but there were also miners whose traditions 
went back to the nineteenth century, there 
were port workers, banana workers and go 
on. The communist party had been allowed a 
certain amount of room to manoeuvre by the 
Somoza regime. In the late 40s Somoza gave 
the unions a labour charter which was seen 
by the communist party as a concession to 
the labour movement because of their 
political pressure. The communist party was 
not actively persecuted. You can compare it 
with the relations between Batista and the 
Communist Party in Cuba at certain periods 
where they were allowed a certain immunity.
When the Sandinistas started their 
movement it was totally separate from the 
communists in a variety of ways. Firstly, the 
communists said that these people were 
adventurists and, secondly, the Sandinistas 
said, “ We cannot use the working class as a 
revolutionary force in Nicaragua” . They 
gave two reasons: the communist party 
controlled the working class and the 
communist party is not revolutionary. They 
also said that the working class was looking 
for favours, was privileged in relation to the 
peasantry, had been given a certain amount 
o f legislation and was too small. A rather 
me c hani c a l  re ject ion of,  and even 
competition with, what they saw as a non­
revolutionary group in the working class.
The Sandinista movement grew as they 
were able to attract the peasantry and it 
became an alliance between radical middle 
class leaders and the peasants. Between 1962 
and 1974 the Sandinistas were an 
announcedly socialist movement, they said 
they were leading a socialist revolution, that 
only a socialist revolution could bring 
improvements to Nicaragua. The communist 
position was that they were working for a 
transitional regime, a national-popular 
regime which would lead to capitalist 
development to be followed by socialist 
development. A two-stage position whereas 
the Sandinistas had a one-stage perspective.
In 1974 the Sandinistas changed their 
perspectives and kidnapped a number of 
prominent people from Managua. This was
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followed by an extremely violent counter­
insurgency campaign against the peasants’ 
base of support in the north-east. Almost all 
the original leaders were killed. So when we 
get to 1975 we have a Sandinista movement 
headed by young people recently coming into 
power in the movement replacing the older 
generation. The older generation, whatever 
you can say about their ideology, at least 
engaged in ideological discussion, whereas 
the new group was very light on ideology. In 
view of the apparent defeat and setbacks of 
the movement during 1974 they split into 
three factions and clearly emerged as three 
separate factions in 1976.
The most powerful, militarily (which is 
leading the current fighting),  is the 
“ Thirdist”  faction. Their position is 
specifically not socialist. They say at the 
present juncture it is not realistic that 
Nicaragua have a socialist revolution. What 
they are looking for is to get rid of the Somoza 
regime and replace it with a regime which 
allows the political organizing that is 
necessary to build a basis for a socialist 
revolution. They say that they are eventually 
interested in socialism but this is not the time 
for a socialist revolution to happen in 
Nicaragua. On that basis, they were able to 
attract the support of the “Twelve” and use 
the “Twelve” as a basis of negotiation with 
business groups to the right of the “Twelve” .
The “ Twelve” are very prominent people: a 
priest, a former rector of the University of 
Nicaragua, a lawyer, the biggest kingpin of 
business outside Somoza himself. This group 
of people are clearly opposed to the regime of 
Somoza and admired the fighting ability of 
the Sandinistas, but were afraid of its 
socialist ideology. So when the Thirdist 
faction of the Sandinistas looked for an 
alliance of the middle class and the 
establishment in order to bring down the 
Somoza regime more quickly, and talked 
from what they thought was a strong enough 
military basis of support to negotiate from a 
position of strength, they brought out the 
“Twelve” and nominated them in response to 
Somoza saying, following US pressure, “ We 
should have dialogue with the opposition” . 
The Sandinistas said, “ Yes, we’ll have a 
dialogue and here are the people that we are 
willing to dialogue with, we nominate these 
people as the intermediaries” . The “Twelve” , 
already in exile, immediately had further 
charges against them as subversives, and if
they returned they would be held up on 
charges. At that point, they had their 
lawyers go to the Supreme Court and the 
charges were dropped. In July 1978 ten of 
them returned to Nicaragua and there was a 
huge outpouring of mass demonstrations, 
people walked from the city to the airport 
because all the buses had been cancelled. 
They split up and went to different parts of 
the country where they had mass meetings to 
commemorate massacres perpetrated by the 
Somozas, a student massacre, an Indian 
massacre, a labour massacre, and so on. In 
each place they got a massive turnout and 
they not only spoke out against Somoza, but 
spoke about the Sandinistas as the spirit of 
the new Nicaragua. They clearly identified 
with the Sandinista movement. In fact, one 
of the “ Twelve” went to Honduras before 
coming back to Nicaragua, to meet with his 
son, a leader of the Sandinistas. His son 
assured him that the Sandinistas were not 
struggling for socialism in the short run.
The other two factions who split away still 
call themselves Sandinistas. The “ Workers’ 
Tendency” considers itself marxist and 
socialist and sees the main tactic of military 
confrontation with the National Guard as an 
ineffective way of building a revolutionary 
movement. What is missing from the 
Sandinistas, they said, is the politicization of 
the workers. Instead of abandoning the 
urban working class to the communists, they 
should build a base among the urban 
working class as a pre-requisite to a 
revolutionary transformation. So instead of 
armed confrontation, there should be armed 
underground organizers. That’s what they 
did and apparently had particular success in 
recent times (when Somoza opened up, for 
instance, with the return of the “Twelve” ) 
with the general strikes. The strikes were 
initiated by business groups and workers 
were nevertheless involved,  although 
without their own banners or demands. So it 
was fertile ground for organizing the 
working class. Rumour has it that the 
Workers’ Tendency has made tremendous 
advances during the last year.
The third faction is called the GPP. 
Apparently their perspective is long-term 
guerilla war and they see themselves as 
maoists. They say only a prolonged guerilla 
war will bring about victory. They are a bit of 
a mystery but I gather that they are the least 
important faction. However, they continued
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armed action whereas the Workers’ 
Tendency” formally abandoned guerilla 
action, although it’s clear that they were 
involved in the recent fighting particularly 
where it related to their own areas of support. 
There have been rumours that the three 
factions have been in a tactical alliance since 
September.
The actual demands and programs of the 
factions are hard to ascertain. The only 
concrete evidence we have is the Thirdists’ 
program. In July and August they didn’t 
demand that the National Guard be 
dismantled as a basis for peace. In fact they 
indicated that they would stop fighting short 
of destroying the National Guard. However, 
during the fighting they issued a new three- 
point program; Somoza must go; the Guard 
must be replaced by the Sandinista 
Liberation Front; and that a transitional 
government be formed which included the 
“Twelve” .
When they put forward that point on the 
National Guard it was a point that would 
divide them from the business groups whose 
first point was to retain the Guard and that 
the Sandinistas lay down their arms and 
negotiate peace. In other words, as the 
movement seemed to be defeating the Guard, 
they moved to a more radical position 
without the moderate business support. Now 
with the decline of the military success of the 
Sandinistas they have gone back to the 
original position.
Opposition fronts
As well as the Sandinistas, there has been 
a series of opposition fronts. The longest 
standing one, UDEL, goes back to about two 
years ago. The centre o f this opposition 
coalition was Chamorro. It included the 
communists (PSN), the conservative 
opposition (one group of conservatives went 
over to Somoza), a split-away group from 
Somoza’s Liberal party, some elements in the 
Catholic church, and some business groups. 
UDEL was seen as a much more moderate 
opposition than the Sandinistas. UDEL 
called for moderate reform and the 
Sandinistas for armed struggle. UDEL’s 
only popular support was through the 
communist party (the PSN) and their 
connections in the labour movement.
With the “Twelve” moving in as an 
intermediary between the moderate
opposition and the Sandinistas, you had the 
construction of the Broad Opposition Front 
(FAO). It included many more groups, the 
“Twelve” who were seen as spokesmen for 
the S a n d i n i s t a s  but  were  r e a l l y  
intermediaries, UDEL, other business 
organizations that had been active in the 
January lockout. It seemed to include 
everybody except the other two factions of 
the Sandinistas. However, it was a very 
shifting and not very disciplined opposition; 
it was a broad coalition based on a minimum 
of agreements but it was the broadest 
umbrella in opposing Somoza.
Another coalition of which not much is 
known is NPU, a coalition of the National 
Union of Students and a national coalition of 
women’s organizations.
Sandinistas activities
There has been concerted work in 
organizing the peasants, particularly where 
the Sandinistas have had traditional 
support. They are also reaching out to other 
areas. There has been fighting in the 
countryside for years and in this area the 
Sandinistas have been relatively successful 
but at the expense of very many peasant lives 
who have been killed and tortured. The 
government has been unable to defeat the 
Sandinistas in the countryside and so what 
is new in this offensive is the struggles in the 
cities in which there has been a certain 
amount of spontaneity but considerable 
widespread support.
When the “Twelve” travelled around the 
c o u n t r y  t her e  wer e  s p o n t a n e o u s  
mobilisations in support of them. The people 
when asked by journalists, “Who are the 
‘Twelve’?” , responded by saying, “ they are 
the above ground of the Sandinistas” . They 
identify the “ Twelve” as Sandinistas when 
the “Twelve” don’t identify themselves as 
Sandinistas. This was a projection of what 
the people wanted. The tendency is to think 
that the opposition is the Sandinistas and so 
a lot of the rallying against the military is a 
result of that. The backbone of the military 
struggle against the National Guard has 
been organized by cadres who have been able 
to call on widespread support but not in the 
same way as in Vietnam.
It’s more an anti-repression, anti-Somoza 
feeling that is sweeping Nicaragua, rather 
than any ideological concepts. □
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Australia: The Asia Connection, Jim Hyde 
Kibble Books, 1978.
The theory of imperialism has always been one 
of the stronger aspects of marxism, and some of 
the new applications o f it in the context of the 
“ development dilemma” in the contemporary 
world represent one o f the intellectual features of 
the times. Many conventional scholars recognize 
its importance, and some have been influenced by 
the approach. If conservative “ modernization” 
theory still holds sway in Western universities, it is 
largely due to institutional constraints rather than 
any theoretical vitality; indeed, it has all the 
appearances o f being a burnt out case.
This is not to say that marxian or neo-marxian 
“core-periphery” theories — to give them one of the 
many labels they bear — are without their 
problems and weaknesses. But the lively 
controversy that marks the field (well documented 
in the Review of African Political Economy, 
which has an excellent running bibliography) is 
imbued with an elan that stems from a real feeling 
of breakthrough. Those working in the field are not 
afraid to tackle unresolved and contentious issues 
because they believe — rightly or wrongly — that 
they are on the right track, and they have 
generally set high standards of scholarship.
It is disappointing, then, that a book which 
opens up an Australian perspective in this field 
should prove on close acquaintance to fail in its 
aims. It is not only that the book omits to take 
account of the literature and methodology relevant 
to its undertaking, but that within its own 
framework it should fall too far short of clinching 
its arguments. It sets out to place Australia within 
the context o f an imperialist “ Pacific Rim 
Strategy” , of which the major actors are the 
United States and Japan, but never quite hits the 
mark, perhaps because it is over the hill.
Bruce McFarlane, now Professor of Politics at 
Adelaide University, was the first Australian to 
refer to a Pacific Rim Strategy being fashioned in 
the United States, so far as I can recall. His 
comments upon it (in Australian Capitalism, 
edited by Play ford and Kirsner, 1972) were rather 
cryptic, but appeared to discern moves towards the 
integration of the economies of the Pacific coast of 
the US, Canada and Latin America, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand, into an imperial 
network strung together by multinational 
operations. He referred to three tiers in the system:
“a leading tier (the US and Japan); a second tier 
delivering resources to the first (Australia, New 
Zealand and Chile); and a third tier o f 
underdeveloped Asian countries with large 
potential markets (Thailand, V ietnam ).” 
(Australian Capitalism, p. 52.)
I am not aware that McFarlane has followed up 
his early references to the strategy, but at any rate 
the present work, the avowed purpose of which is 
to examine Australia’s role in it, gives us a 
somewhat different picture of the origins and 
character of the Pacific Strategy Rim. This is how 
Robert Catley and Nonie Sharp, in their 
in trod u ction  to Austral i a :  The Asi a  
Connection, present it:
The withdrawal of the United States from active 
and direct engagement in Asia and the Pacific 
following the defeat in Indochina and the 
e la b ora tion  o f  the N ixon  d octr in e  was 
accompanied by a strategic reorientation of US 
foreign policy towards the countries of the Pacific 
B asin . The new p o licy  represented  an 
abandonm ent o f defence-in-depth and the 
advancement of a policy in which the advanced 
capitalist countries provided capital for local 
compradors (p. 3). In the elaboration o f the 
Strategy, the United States and Japan were to 
form the first tier, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada became the second tier, acting as a 
springboard for investment into the lowest tier, hte 
Third World countries of the area (p. 5).
The differences between the Pacific Rim theses 
of McFarlane, on the one hand, and Catley and 
Sharp on the other, are quite striking. In the first 
place, there is the timing. In McFarlane’s account, 
the Strategy was being devised at least as early as 
1968, well before US withdrawal from Asia was 
being seriously contemplated, and indeed his 
inclusion of Vietnam in the thi.-d tier makes it clear 
that for him the Strategy has no necessary 
connection with the abandonment of defence-in- 
depth. For Catley and Sharp, however, the 
Strategy is the outcome o f a reorientation 
fo llo w in g  m ilitary  w ith d ra w a l and the 
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine.
The time disjunction is connected with a 
differing understanding of the character of the 
process. McFarlane obviously views it as a stage in 
the rationalization of imperialist penetration — in
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other words, the articulation of a structural 
process o f a kind which flows from the very nature 
of capitalist exploitation. Catley and Sharp, 
however, see it as a response to the failure of US 
military intervention in Indochina — in other 
words, a political process of foreign policy 
modification. The importance of this variation is 
that, while McFarlane’s concept does identify 
something that may accurately be described as a 
Strategy, that of Catley and Sharp does not — it 
may more plausibly be regarded as an 
accommodation by the US to circumstances no 
longer amenable to more direct forms of control. 
After all, if the only feature of the “ Strategy” is the 
use o f investment and aid as levers o f power and 
influence in the region, then there is nothing new 
in it — it is as old as neocolonialism itself.
At this point, however, Catley and Sharp do 
introduce something new, and once again 
different from the McFarlane presentation. Where 
he saw the role of the second tier powers, including 
Australia, as limited to providing raw materials to 
the first tier, Catley and Sharp have them “ acting 
as a springboard for investment into the lowest 
tier, the Third World countries of the area” . This 
suggests that the new element in contemporary 
imperialist penetration of the Pacific Rim — and 
that which justifies reference to a new Strategy — 
is a change in the structural relationship between 
the first and second tier powers. Hence tbe point of 
this book, presumably, is to illustrate this 
structural change in the case o f Australia.
What type of evidence do we need to confirm the 
existence of a Strategy such as that posited by 
Sharp, Catley and Hyde? First, we require an 
analysis o f the strategic thinking expounded by 
ideologists of the dominant power, the United 
States, in this area. Secondly, we need an 
examination o f the actual operations o f 
im perialist agencies and multinationals, 
demonstrating the structural changes that have 
taken place in their relations with Australia. 
Thirdly, we need to observe these operations being 
carried out in the third world countries of the 
Pacific in the form prescribed.
Extraordinarily, no evidence o f the first kind is 
presented at all. In fact, the only direct evidence 
adduced for the existence of a Pacific Rim 
Strategy, and Australia’s role in it, is a speech in 
Sydney by one Neil Mclnnes, a Wall Street 
journalist, in 1970 — material previously cited by 
McFarlane. Now it is one thing for Bruce 
McFarlane in 1972 to pick up some Pacific Rim 
noises in the US and Australia and hypothesize a 
strategy in the making: even if wrong, he was 
engaging in early and shrewd speculation. It is 
quite another thing for writers in 1978 to have 
nothing to offer in support of their thesis than this 
old, and less than authoritative, citation. Nobody 
could argue that Americans are shy about spelling 
out their strategies, especially in areas such as this 
where their ideology perceives nothing but world
benefit from them. The absence of such indicators 
casts grave doubt on the thesis, since it suggests 
the US strategists do not perceive the 
enhancement of their interests in this particular 
shape.
Similarly, the book provides no systematic 
treatment of structural changes in the relations 
between US and Australian business to confirm 
the argument that Australia acts as a springboard 
for investment in Asia or the Pacific. There is some 
material in the book — not a lot — indicating 
multinational connections between the US, Japan 
and Australia; it would be surprising if there were 
not, since links of this kind are a world-wide 
phenomenon and part of the very character of the 
multinational corporation. But if there is a 
strategic principle behind the process here, it is 
certainly not identified in this book. The American 
radical literature I have seen on Pacific Rim (or 
Basin) Strategy provides no assistance. It is as 
lacking in precision as the Australian version, one 
account even swallowing the Indian Ocean for 
good measure; it makes little reference to 
Australia’s role.
Finally, Hyde does not succeed in establishing a 
salient role for Australia in the penetration o f the 
Pacific, as I argue in more detail shortly, in 
considering his two case studies: investment in 
Indonesia, and influence within ASEAN.Before
going into that, however, I ought to make clear 
that I have singled out the enunciation of the 
Pacific Rim thesis by Sharp and Catley for 
criticism not because it is the weakest formulation 
of the argument in the book, but because it is the 
only one. Hyde does not present the thesis at all, 
and when he comments on it, he tends to confuse 
matters rather than clarify them. At one point he 
has the seeds of the Pacific Rim Strategy being 
sown “ well over twenty years ago” (p. 2), which 
suggests that he does not see any clear distinction 
b etw een  th e  g e n e r a l p b e n o m e n o n  o f  
neocolonialism and the varying strategies by 
which it may be carried forward, which of course is 
what the book is supposed to be all about. He never 
gives a clear account of the content or dates of 
elaboration o f the Nixon Doctrine, but has 
Whitlam at one and the same time anticipating 
and responding to it — in 1968! (pp. 15-16.) It may 
seem querulous to point out that Nixon assumed 
the Presidency in January 1969, but the reader 
needs some fixed compass points in the tangled 
thickets of this book’s argument.
With regard to Australia’s role in the strategy, 
Hyde is at pains to stress a number of times tbat 
this country’s “ history as a colony and recipient of 
substantial amounts of foreign capital has left it 
relatively free o f the stigma of imperialism 
attached to developed states which had been old 
colonial powers, and therefore enjoyed some 
advantages in investment and influence in the 
region” . It is on this basis that he argues for the
38 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 67
significance of Australia’s role in the Pacific Rim 
Strategy. It is never really clear whether the main 
effect of this is to make Australia a desirable front 
for American and Japanese multinationals, or to 
give Australian business a lever for its own self- 
interest within the terms of the Strategy. Hyde 
appears to take both positions at different points, 
which he may do consistently but ought to do more 
clearly. In any case, it is not of great moment, 
because I do not think the point has much to 
recommend it. For those in the region who cared, 
A ustralia ’s reputation and record — on 
decolonization, racialism, interventionism — were 
putrid, but that does not seem to have affected 
investment opportunities one way or the other, 
though it may have set us back in some political 
arenas such as ASEAN. Certainly, I cannot see 
any evidence that either the US or Japan has been 
seriously discommoded in investment operations 
by its past record, still less that either one has 
benefitted from a friendly Australian helping 
hand. Another feature of business in Asia, 
commented on by many observers, is the nostalgic 
sympathy shown by governing elites there 
towards their old colonial masters: the Dutch in 
Indonesia and the British in Malaysia, for 
example.
This faulty proposition leads Hyde to 
exaggerate A ustralia ’s role in respect of 
investment in Indonesia and influence within 
ASEAN. Australian companies, he tells us, 
invested $250 million in Indonesia between 1966 
and 1973, giving them a five per cent share in total 
foreign investment in the country. Hyde regards 
this as cogent evidence of Australia’s active 
participation in the Pacific Rim Strategy, its 
favoured opportunities in the region and its role as 
a multinational carpet-bagger. But his figures 
hardly justify the claim that Australia has a 
special entree to Indonesia, and indeed, given the 
stress laid by successive Australian governments 
on relations with Indonesia — especially economic 
relations — the thing that really needs explaining 
is why Australian business has proved so unable 
or unwilling to play the part assigned to it more 
effectively.
This point becomes sharper when we make two 
necessary corrections to Hyde’s figures. The most 
reliable figures for investment in Indonesia are 
those released by that country’s Investment Co­
ordinating Board (BKPM), and these show that 
between 1967 and April 1978 total foreign 
investment from all sources totalled $6,636 
million, o f which Australian com panies 
con tribu ted  $215.7 m illion  ( Indonesia  
Development News, I, 6, June 1978, p. 6). This 
gives Australia a three per cent, rather than a five 
per cent, share in the investment market — rather 
a modest stake, I would have thought. However, 
even these figures do not tell the whole story, 
because they represent only approved 
investment proposals, not realized investment.
There are no figures obtainable for realized 
investment, so we have no sure way of knowing if 
Australian companies have been as willing to put 
their money where their mouth is as, say, 
Japanese or American investors; there is some 
impressionistic evidence, however, to suggest that 
they have not.
The ASEAN chapter, designed to demonstrate 
the manner in which Australia has asserted a 
regional role within the Rim Strategy, achieves the 
reverse of its intention. With no preamble on the 
origin or significance of ASEAN, either for PRS or 
anything else, Hyde launches into an account of 
Whitlam’s efforts to have it widened into a non- 
ideological regional community including Japan 
and China. We are assured at one point that 
Whitlam’s proposal “ must be seen as part of the 
wider Pacific Rim Strategy”  (p. 61), but we are not 
told why or how. At another point, Hyde says that 
“ it was in fact part o f the government’s plan to 
increase Australian power within the Pacific Rim 
Strategy” (p. 81). Again no explanation, merely 
assertion. All this raises the question o f w'hether or 
not it was a US-approved ploy, but unfortunately 
we are not enlightened. However, once again we 
are invited to accept the notion that Australia 
could press this proposal because of the goodwill 
which it — but not the US or Japan — enjoyed 
within the region.
There is an obvious snag in this argument, of 
which Hyde is aware — namely that Whitlam’s 
proposal got very short shrift in ASEAN, which 
continues to resist expansion o f its membership, 
especially ^ny expansion which will admit first 
tier powers^ Nevertheless, Hyde feels compelled to 
stand by an argument which does poor justice to 
the complex struggle of interests within and 
concerning ASEAN which emerges from his own 
account. Contrary to the impression he is trying to 
create, one if left with the feeling either that the 
first tier powers lack leverage within ASEAN or 
that Australia’s much-vaunted goodwill is a myth.
These instances are set in the Whitlam era, and 
indeed form the crux of a theory which Hyde has 
about the role played by the Whitlam Government 
is gearing Australia for the demands of PRS. 
Shortly, he argues that Labor in office cleared 
away the detritus of antiquated LCP foreign 
policies, devised a regional orientation for 
Australia, and vigorously promoted an Australian 
component in multinational operations in the 
area. However, Whitlam transgressed the 
operational code of PRS by seeking to push 
Australian interests too strongly through his 
minerals policy, and had to go. Fraser now 
implements the Strategy in a manner more 
befitting the demands of the first tier powers and 
Australia’s capacities.
Here we encounter two familiar ideological 
axioms of the Australian left. The first is that 
Labor is brought to power whenever the capitalist
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system needs a bit of renovating, and gets the boot 
as soon as it has performed its task. There is 
something intriguing about this contention, 
because it bears at least a superficial relation to the 
facts, and it may be that if stated and investigated 
in a more sophisticated sociological formulation it 
will prove illuminating.
The second proposition is a non-sequitur upon 
the first. Since Labor is a renovating force for 
capitalism, it goes, then in Hyde’s words, 
“ obviously the new government did not forsee (sic) 
any change in Australia’s foreign policy, only its 
rationalization” (p. 36). Now that I do not find 
intriguing or even tolerable. The slightest thought 
ought to persuade anyone that any attempt to 
rationalize LCP foreign policy o f the sixties would 
have produced nothing but complete mental 
breakdown. Change was what was desperately 
needed, and change was what we got. We may not 
all have approved the changes, or their 
limitations, but this is poor reason for denying 
that they occurred.
Old axioms .... and a new myth. It appears that 
our authors (including here Catley and Sharp as 
well as Hyde) are disenchanted with non­
communist Southeast Asia; they seem to think it 
will be successfully incorporated into “ the 
system” , and they find no signs of healthy anti­
imperialism there. Some nationalism  is 
noticeable, Hyde informs us, “ but this is of a 
capitalist nature, orchestrated by capitalist 
bou rgeo is ie  opposed  to the com prador 
stranglehold on local industry, and one which 
‘should be distinguished from that of more broadly 
based political movements which mtempt to 
remove foreign domination ....’ ”  (p. 24). So much 
for the Thai upsurge of 1974-75, the Jakarta riots of 
January 1974 and the challenge to Suharto’s 
succession in 1978. So much too for the largest 
insurgency in the region — in north and northeast 
Thailand — not to mention the NPA in the 
Philippines etc.
The writers have shifted their gaze, and their 
hopes, elsewhere. Catley and Sharp have 
discovered Melanesia and Polynesia, which 
according to them are not yet integrated into 
Pacific Rim Strategy, whose petitions are more 
closely those of non-alignment, which boast 
dominant people’s movements and a relative 
absence of bourgeois and comprador classes. 
Consequently, “ the growth o f people’s movements 
in opposition to neo-imperial domination which 
has already come from the peoples of East Timor 
and West Irian and more recently from the New 
Hebrides (Vanuaaku) are likely to increase their 
impact. This may be expected to develop through 
increasing mutual support with the growing strata 
of people within Australia itself — intellectuals 
and sections of the working class — who look to a 
future outside the framework o f capitalism” (pp. 
10 - 11 ).
It is hard to know where to begin to untangle this 
skein of self-delusion. One can point out that the 
conditions in Melanesia and Polynesia remarked 
by Catley and Sharp were also present in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s, and did not 
prevent the emergence of regimes like those in 
Ghana. Zaire, Uganda, Malawi, The Central 
African Republic etc. etc. One can demonstrate 
that Papua New Guinea and Fiji at any rate are 
well and truly enmeshed in the world capitalist 
network, call it Pacific Rim or what you will. One 
can point out that the people’s movements referred 
to only exist in colonial and colonial-type 
situations, and are notably absent in the 
politically independent states of the Pacific. One 
can argue that Asian countries have long and 
tenacious traditions of rebellion and nationalist 
assertion which are hardly likely to prove less 
significant for the future than those of the Pacific 
islands. One can express some skepticism about 
the strength of anti-capitalist elements in 
Australia as a force for radical change in the 
region. But in the end. I guess, the Australian left 
sorely needs romances to feed on: real red-blooded 
revolutionary meat is in very short supply.
Reluctantly, I am obliged to point out that, 
although published in 1978, the book is 
constructed upon data up to 1975, with an 
accasional footnote to July 1976. In some cases, 
the information (e.g., on US military aid to 
Southeast Asia, Japanese export prospects in 
1980) is so outdated as to be positively misleading. 
The chapter on Indonesia contains a number of 
errors, one of which — that there has been “ a 
general rise in the standard of living” under 
Suharto — is rather curious in a book of this 
tendency.
I am loath to conclude this review without some 
clarification of my position with regard to its 
theme. Insofar as its aim is to explore Australia’s 
role in core-periphery relations within the Pacific 
area, I started off with a bias in its favour. I do not 
find the Pacific Rim thesis very helpful in this 
regard, however, partly because the evidence for it 
is so thin, and partly because it appears to me to 
oversimplify grossly both the present state of 
inter-imperialist collaboration and rivalry within 
the region, and the complex web of national 
tendencies and alignments in Southeast Asia. But 
most of all I feel obliged to object when any case is 
presented so sloppily and with so little regard to 
empirical verification as this one is. I finished the 
book with the impression that without the 
encumbrance of the PRS thesis, Hyde may have 
produced a much better account of Australia’s role 
in the Southeast Asian region, but that he would 
still need to assemble his facts and argument with 
a good deal more rigour.
— Rex Mortimer
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CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY and the case 
for SOCIALIST FEMINISM edited by Zillah 
R. Eisenstein, Monthly Review Press, $22.30 
(Aust.).
This book is a useful contribution to the 
development of socialist feminist theory, though 
also reflecting some of its dilemmas. It is a 
collection of essays from individuals and groups 
based mainly in the United States of America — 
Jean Gardner from Leeds on “ Women’s Domestic 
Labor” and Margaret Randall living in Cuba 
being the exceptions.
Zillah Eisenstein acknowledges that socialist 
feminism “both as theory and in practice is very 
much in the process o f developing” and has chosen 
contributions which attempt to make a synthesis 
between feminism and marxism and which reject 
the notion of simply adding one to the other. In this 
respect the contributors are neither hostile to 
radical feminism nor classical marxism, but 
critical of both, while acknowledging their 
differing contributions to an understanding of 
women’s oppression.
The book is divided into six broad headings:- 
developing a theory of capitalist patriarchy; 
motherhood and reproduction; socialist feminist 
historical analysis; female work; patriarchy in 
revolutionary society (China and Cuba); and some 
experiences of socialist feminist groups in 
America.
In the first article “ Developing a Theory of 
Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism” 
Zillah Eisenstein defines the concerns of socialist 
fem in ists  as bein g  a com m itm ent “ to 
understanding the system of power deriving from 
capitalist patriarchy” ... “ the mutually reinforcing 
dialectical relationship between capitalist class 
structures and hierarchical sexual structuring ... 
Although patriarchy (as male supremacy) existed 
before capitalism, and continues in postcapitalist 
societies, it is their present relationship that must 
be understood if the structures of oppression is to 
be changed. In this sense socialist feminism moves 
beyond singular marxist analysis and isolated 
radical feminist theory” (p. 5).
Eisenstein sets out to extract Marx’s analytical 
method and apply it to “ some dimensions of power
relations to which he was not sensitive” . She 
discusses Marx’s theory o f alienation and women 
as a potential revolutionary force, the con­
tributions made to understanding women’s 
oppress-ion by liberal and radical feminists, and 
examines the sexual division of labor.
She makes a connection between patriarchy and 
capitalism through the sexual division of labor 
and suggests some inadequacies in traditional 
marxist class analysis. However she points to new 
directions and complexities without providing us 
with a new analysis.
In notes on strategy at the end of her article she 
makes a distinction between theory and strategy... 
“although I think the development of theory and 
strategy should be interrelated, I see them as 
somewhat separate activities. Theory allows you 
to think about new possibilities. Strategy grows 
out of the possibilities... Existing formulations of 
strategy tend to limit and distort new possibilities 
for organising for revolutionary change” .
In this as in other contributions, the connections 
between the writer and the actual experience of 
women is evident and is one of the positive features 
of this work.
In “ Some Notes on the Relations of Capitalist 
Patriarchy” Eisenstein discusses briefly the 
importance of the question “ why does women’s 
oppression happen?” , stating that even if it’s 
impossible to explain how it originated at least we 
must explore why it continues to happen now. She 
shows how no activity, including that o f women, 
can be understood outside o f their social context 
i.e. capitalism and patriarchy and that an 
examination o f the relationship between what 
happens in the family and what happens in 
society generally is essential to attempt to bring 
about basic social changes.
In “ Feminist, Theorv and the Development of 
Revolutionary Strategy” , Nancy Hartsock sees 
theory as a “ force for change” and not just 
something done by academics but “ is always 
implicit in our activity and goes so deep as to 
include our very understanding of reality” . 
Therefore “ we can either accept the categories 
given to us by capitalist society or we can begin to 
develop a critical understanding o f our world” .
Based on this view of theory she stresses the 
importance of the personal in political change and 
that “ everyday life must be the basis for our 
political work” . She adds to the traditional 
marxist concept of the masses learning from
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engagement in action, the feminist method that 
“ human activities also change us. A fundamental 
redefinition of the self is an integral part o f action 
for political change” .
She recognises the need for collective action and 
sees that the formation and strength of this 
collective is dependent on the ability of the 
individuals within it being able to change 
capitalist concepts of the individual. In this way 
she makes a connection between personal change 
and social practice. Further she says that “ we can 
only transform ourselves by struggling to 
transform the social relations which define us: 
changing selves and changing social institutions 
are simply two aspects o f the same process” .
In discussing the importance of feminism for 
revolutionary change she suggests three factors of 
particular importance:- “ (1) The focus on everyday 
life and experience makes action a necessity, not a 
moral choice or an option. We are not fighting 
other people’s battles but our own. (2) The nature of 
our understanding o f theory is altered and theory 
is brought into an integral and everyday relation 
with practice. (3) Theory leads directly to a 
transformation o f social relations both in 
consciousness and in reality because of its close 
connections to real needs (p. 64).”
She also points to the importance for feminists to 
develop new forms o f organisation that 
correspond with their political experiences, that 
rejection of hierarchies and domination does not 
mean the rejection o f all structure.
Unfortunately Hartsock does not confront the 
problems which now arise from large numbers of 
women being brought into political actions by the 
processes she describes. The development of 
political action and consciousness brings with it a 
realisation of other people’s oppression and the 
need for common actions against common 
enemies. The dilemma for revolutionary feminists 
as with other revolutionaries is how to act on this 
developed revolutionary consciousness without 
losing the strength and vitality of grass roots 
responses and priorities.
In the section on “ Motherhood, Reproduction 
and Male Supremacy” Nancy Chodorow discusses 
the importance of mothering and motherhood in 
the reproduction of social relations, including that 
of motherhood as an institution. Linda Gordon 
discusses the centrality o f control over 
reproduction in the struggle for wom en’s 
liberation.
“ In all societies there is a mutually determining 
relationship between women’s mothering and the 
organisation o f production” , says Chodorow. She 
discusses how motherhood and mothering are 
women’s realm, the connection between the two 
made to appear “ natural” , and the family seen as a 
natural rather than a social creation. She then 
discusses mothering as “ pivotal to the 
reproduction of the capitalist mode o f production” .
Post-Freudian psychology and sociology has 
provided new rationales for the idealisation and 
endorsement of women’s maternal role, as it has 
emphasised the crucial importance o f the mother- 
child relationship ...” , she states, while pointing 
out that as women have had less children their 
exclusive responsibility for child care has 
increased.
She concludes that “women will still be 
responsible for child care, unless we make the 
reorganising of parenting a central political goal” . 
This is evident even in countries where women 
have entered the paid work force and alternate 
child care has been provided.
Linda Gordon continues her examination, 
started in “ Woman’s Body, Woman’s Right” of 
women’s struggle for control o f reproduction and 
its theoretical implications. She begins by telling 
us to reject "the myth of a prehistorical epoch of 
sexual freedom. In every known human society 
sexual activity has been controlled and limited... 
We must also reject the notion that birth control 
was introduced at a particular moment and 
thereafter began to affect sexual practice... The 
suppression of birth control seems to have been 
coincident with the development of agriculture” .
The suppression o f birth control, she says, was 
both a matter o f male supremacy and economics.
She makes an historical examination of feminist 
campaigns and attitudes about birth control and 
the two periods 1920-45 when birth control 
campaigns became part of the eugenics movement 
to “help” the poor and 1945-60 when it became part 
o f an international population control movement.
She criticises the notion that if women have less 
children they will automatically have more 
rewarding lives and shows that despite the drop in 
the birthrate most women spend as many hours on 
housework and mothering as some years ago.
In making a critical assessment of “ sexual 
liberation” which dehumanises sexual relations, 
replaces child bearing with highly questionable 
alternatives and turns birth control and sex into 
commodities Gordon shows that while control of 
reproduction is central and essential it cannot be 
isolated from the rest o f social practice and 
ideology.
She refers to the birth control struggle as a battle 
rather than the whole war in the fight to change 
sexual relationships. “ Every one o f the conditions 
that would make reproductive freedom possible — 
the elimination of hereditary class and privilege, 
sexual equality and sexual liberation — is a 
radical program in itself.”
She shows how capitalism and patriarchy is 
able to adjust to accommodate and absorb change, 
to produce right to life backlashes and government 
population control programs which force women 
to be sterilised or to have unwanted abortions.
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She concludes: “ Involuntary child bearing has 
burdened all women but poor women most, and the 
sexual inequality that resulted has helped 
perpetuate other forms o f inequality and 
weakened struggle against them. Reproductive 
self-determination is a basic condition for sexual 
equality and for women to assume full 
membership in all other human groups, especially 
the working class.”
In the history section Ellen Dubois examines the 
19th century suffragist movement and Mary Ryan 
traces the development of “ femininity” in the 
years of rapid industrialisation during 1920 to 
1860. Both are based on American experiences but 
are part of the difficult job of constructing 
women’s history which gives important insights 
into the actual conditions and ways that 
patriarchy has developed under capitalism and 
the relationships that exist between the two.
In the section on work Eisenstein sets the 
framework for the discussion by describing some 
of the contradictory views among socialists, i.e. 
domestic work is private, does/does not contribute 
to surplus value, is/is not productive etc. However, 
she states, “ the question of whether women are 
oppressed as proletarians does not hinge on 
whether domestic labor can be squeezed into the 
pre-existing categories.... ”
“ Domestic labor is indispensable to the 
operation o f capitalist patriarchal society as it 
now exists... One then only sees half of reality if 
one examines workers outside the home, as wage 
slaves. The other half is the domestic slave...” (p. 
170)
Jean Gardiner’s article enters into critical 
discussion with “The Housewife and Her Labour 
under Capitalism” by Wally Secombe in New 
Left Review, which she welcomes as an 
indication o f growing awareness among marxists 
o f the importance of the issues involved.
However she challenges Secombe’s attempts to 
show that women help to create surplus value 
when he says that the worker’s wage can be 
divided into two components, one o f which 
represents the full value created by the domestic 
laborer. If this were true then capital would neither 
gain nor lose from domestic labor, giving them no 
apparent economic reason to retain domestic 
labor, states Gardiner.
Apart from leading to empirically ridiculous 
conclusions “ Secombe’s theoretical approach 
denies any validity in their own rights of questions- 
being raised by the feminist movement and is 
based instead on concern over whether 
housewives can make a ‘contribution to the class 
struggle’.”
Gardiner argues that Marx’s definition o f value 
cannot be used to show that women create surplus 
value but that they do in fact produce surplus value
by holding down “ necessary labor, or the value of 
labor power, to a level that is lower than the actual 
subsistence level of the working class” .
She goes on to draw some conclusions for 
struggle from this, such as that in times of 
economic crisis any increase in the socialisation of 
child care or housework would be detrimental from 
the capitalist point of view. While there is 
undoubtedly some truth in this conclusion it does 
not adequately take account of the fact that many 
women are now permanent and necessary parts of 
the workforce even during times of widespread 
unemployment.
Other contributions by Batya Weinbaum, Amy 
Bridges, Heidi Hartmann and Margery Davies 
discuss the sexual division of labor in the paid 
workforce and the work that is involved in being a 
“ consumer” in this society. In “ Woman’s Place is 
at the Typewriter” , Margery Davies attempts to 
redress a little o f the imbalance which comes from 
an overemphasis on women as industrial workers 
when over 40 per cent o f women in the US labor 
force are clerical workers.
In the final two sections of the book, experiences 
in Cuba and China are examined and some lessons 
from socialist feminist organisations in the United 
States recounted.
The examination of societies where capitalist 
relations of production no longer exist helps to 
show that while patriarchy is supported by and 
essential to capitalism , it does not automatically 
disappear when capitalist production is ended. 
Specific studies also help us to see the results of 
some of the reforms and changes advocated by 
socialist feminists in capitalist countries, and to 
ensure that we embody in our revolutionary 
struggle now the seeds of the new society. While 
many important changes are noted in Cuba and 
China, a successful challenge to patriarchy is yet 
to be observed in any society.
The papers on socialist feminist organisation 
indicate a need to find organisational forms that 
better represent our political perspectives and the 
many difficulties that these attempts have run 
into. Faced with a fragmented and divided left and 
the conflicts which arise from efforts to reconcile 
feminism and socialism, socialist feminist 
organisation did not fulfil its original promise. An 
additional problem seems to have been that in 
some groups at least socialist feminist 
organisation was regarded as an alternative to the 
women’s movement rather than an important but 
integral part of it.
There are many important concerns of socialist 
feminists not touched on or only mentioned by 
implication in this volume, but then it is only one 
small contribution to a very large area of 
discussion.
— Joyce Stevens.
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I N T R O D U C I N G  C H R I S T O P H E R  
CAUDWELL
Graham Rowlands
j  Very little marxist literary and cultural criticism 
'■has been written in English. It is presumptuous to 
speak of a tradition. Two different kinds of radical 
books published in the 1970s show the absence of 
an English language tradition.
Alan Swingewood in his and Diana Laurenson’s 
The Sociology of Literature analysed marxist 
cultural critique. By selecting high points of 
debate, however, he succeeded in depersonalizing 
the labor of the various contributors. No matter 
how useful as a concise handbook, Swingewood’s 
argument sounded as if writers and other 
in te lle ctu a ls  had on ly  su bm itted  their 
manuscripts to him for editorial commentary. 
There was no sense of their being alive in their own 
right.
Editor Lee Baxandall’s Radical Perspectives 
in the Arts was oriented to Continental Europe 
and the Third World. The first chapter consisted of 
Meredith Tax’s argument that culture is not 
neutral. An American, she acknowledged that her 
case was largely based on the works of the 
Englishman, Christopher Caudwell. It was 
extraordinary, however, that in her discussion of 
popular culture (via Caudwell) she did not even 
mention the Englishman, Richard Hoggart’s The 
Uses of Literacy. There was, in fact, no 
recognition on. her part that Caudwell was an 
Englishman who based his work primarily on 
English literature, at least in terms of his 
specifically literary criticism.
It is not necessary to devalue Swingewood’s 
analytical progression in order to assert that some 
sense of the contributors to marxist literary and 
cultural criticism would have been beneficial. 
Although the cult of personality or the cult o f the 
pop star must be avoided, the concentration on a 
particular marxist critic can be a humanizing 
experience. Such emphasis can serve to minimize 
the emotional reaction often encountered when 
discussing literature with readers who claim that 
marxists ignore the individuality of the literature 
by only looking for generalized forces at work 
through the poems, plays, novels and much non- 
fictional prose. The lives of critics, including 
marxist critics, have been no less arduous than 
those of many writers.
In stressing the English language, Britain and 
British literary and cultural criticism, it is 
necessary to add that no special claim is made for 
the importance of those small islands now part of 
the E.E.C. It is enriching to read Continental and
Third World criticism. It can not be avoided, 
however, that Australia is an English speaking 
federation based on British law and the 
Westminster system. Despite differences, 
Australia is more like Britain, the United States 
and New Zealand than any other nations. If 
marxists are to understand Australia, it is still 
relevant to understand Britain. The important 
advantage is that some of the understanding will 
be experiential. It will not all have to come from 
books, magazines and newspapers in the print 
medium. While a biographical study of Caudwell 
and his criticism is not possible here, the following 
is an introduction that tries to at least look at the 
whole m ethodological perspective o f this 
Englishman. If it can be seen how inevitably 
English is Caudwell's marxist literary and 
cultural criticism, particularly in his examples, it 
follows that Australian marxist criticism needs to 
be Australian to stand any chance of contributing 
to marxist thought generally. Nothing is 
inevitably Australian in Australia — except its 
geography. All else is inevitably derivative.
It is very common for Australian marxist 
literary critics and reviewers to dismiss Caudwell 
as crude, simplistic and outdated. Marxist should 
not, however, be so defensive that they fear 
standing in the same line or dole queue with the 
earlier exemplars ol what may in time become a 
tradition. Indeed, there is no longer the need for 
such distancing as in the recent past.
Raymond Williams is without question the best 
British marxist literary sociologist to date. His 
own influential strictures about Caudwell need to 
be seen in their historical context. By 1971 
Williams admitted that one of the intellectual 
trends against which he had reacted was the 
crude, simplistic, reductionist marxist theory of 
the 1930s. His Culture and Society has singled 
out Caudwell as a typical example o f everything 
that New Left theory should avoid. It is an 
understandable view for 1958 when the Cold War 
was at a low celcius. It is not, however, a justified 
view by 1978. In fact, anyone familiar with 
Williams’ attacks on the false dualism between 
individual and society will find a close similarity 
with Caudwell. Again, by drawing attention to 
Caudwell's general theory o f history and then his 
specific opinions about the effect of industrial 
capitalism on British poetry, it can be seen that he 
is close to Williams’ own view.
It is best to mention Caudwell’s limitations first. 
He wrote in the 1930s, his thinking being deeply 
influenced by the Great Depression. At least partly 
because he knew the misery caused by capitalism 
in Britain, he refused to believe that there was any 
truth in stories of stalinist horrors in Russia. He 
said that Russian workers were their masters,
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actually believing that the Soviet state was in the 
process of withering away. This was, o f course, 
anything but an isolated view on the British left.
Caudwell dismissed the whole of popular 
culture, a type o f thinking that Richard Hoggart 
later showed to be a gross distortion of its 
complexity, to say nothing of the opportunity lost 
for historical and sociological study of mass art. 
Caudwell was particularly antagonistic to modern 
arts. Surrealism, expressionist drama and jazz all 
exemplified the dying capitalist culture of the 
West. Rather than explicate G.B. Shaw, H.G. 
Wells, T.E. and D.H. Lawrence, his chapters used 
them as bouncing boards for the further 
development of his own ideas.
When one or two o f his often florid phrases such 
as Shakespeare’s Ariel being the “ apotheosis of 
the free wage-labourer” was added to the above 
limitations, it was quite easy for commentators to 
write off Caudwell as a crank or for Western 
academics to use his comments on The Tempest 
as a standard common room joke. But the text of 
his books Illusion and Reality and Studies and 
Further Studies in a Dying Culture requires 
scrutiny and consideration. He was denied an 
opportunity of writing books of greater stylistic 
felicity by being killed by Franco’s fascists during 
the Spanish Civil War, aged 29.
Read structurally, however, he can not be 
dismissed by ritualistic regurgitation of the odd 
phrase from one of his books. Like the European 
marxist literary and social commentators Ernst 
Fischer, George Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann, he 
is best when analysing a wide sweep o f history or 
range of societies. His bibliographies list reading 
in a dozen disciplines. He tries to say something 
that sums up a century. The approach remains 
more useful than all the apparatus of formal 
scholarship brought to bear on a topic such as 
“Death by Spontaneous Combustion in the 19th 
century Novel” .
Caudwell’s cultural theory repeatedly attacks 
the bourgeois capitalist concept of freedom. He 
demolishes the liberal notian of individualism. He 
elaborates on Marx’s dialectic between thought 
and action, refusing to reduce that dynamic 
interplay to economic determinism with no 
possibility of ideas reaching back on the rest of 
society. His view of art as social action is a 
concomitant of the dialectic. Moreover, his 
devastating attacks on psychology and religion 
correlate with his theory of history.
The bourgeois illusion is that men and women 
are naturally free. Their free instincts are 
naturally good. But all the organizations of society 
limit and cripple these free instincts. Caudwell 
argues that this notion is a false dichotomy. 
Freedom is not a product of instincts but of societal 
relationships as they have emerged via the human 
race’s struggle to master nature. People do not 
remain people if social relations in all their
complexity are removed.
Bourgeois freedom ignores real societal 
relationships. Caudwell believes in fact that the 
b ou rgeo is ie  has e ither co n s c io u s ly  or 
unconsciously disguised them as relations among 
commodities, impersonal markets, cash and 
capital. When economically powerful groups or 
classes o f people dominate things they do not 
realize that the things dominated are disguised 
human relationships. The dominant groups or 
classes themselves relate to other groups or classes 
only as things. People have enslaved themselves 
to forces that grew beyond them because they did 
not acknowledge their existence.
For Caudwell, as for Engels, freedom is the 
consciousness of necessity. For the bourgeoisie 
freedom is the ignorance o f necessity. People 
become free not by realizing themselves in 
opposition to society (which would entail rebellion 
against even their own language) but by realizing 
themselves through society. The character of the 
association in itself imposes certain forms and 
conventions which are the badge of freedom. The 
more people understand the correlation between 
consciousness and productive relations, the more 
they can control society’s impact on themselves 
and nature. As soon as one has knowledge of 
necessity one has some power.
The bourgeois, who awoke free only to find the 
self in feudal chains, broke the chains but retained 
one societal restraint — private property. He or she 
did not consider this a restraint but a natural right. 
What the bourgeois sees as a natural right 
Caudwell sees as private property protected in the 
long run by coercion. The have-nots have to be 
coerced by the haves. The dominance of one class 
over another is expressed in police, laws and 
armies. The have-nots are working people from 
whose labor the bourgeoisie have extracted profits 
for purchase of private property if they have not 
inherited it. Caudwell expresses the power 
relationship ironically: “The free labourer, owning 
nothing, was free to sell his labour to any market” .
Caudwell does not believe that all ideas are 
determined by economic forces of production. He 
says that thought flows from how people find 
themselves in the world. He accepts that people 
change their consciousness by changing their 
social and economic relations. Although thought 
learns how to guide people from action, it is equally 
true that th ou ght gu ides a ction . The 
superstructure o f ideas and customs is not a mirror 
image of economic productive processes. It 
interacts with the foundations. They alter each 
other.
People never consciously form a society; society 
forms people. Consequently people are active 
centres for fresh transformations. In turn they 
form society. This social process, for Caudwell, is 
history. People are affected by animals and nature 
and in turn they affect animals and nature by
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interaction for economic production which is also 
social organization. History is the law of motion 
among people as societally organized animals.
Language is a particularly important part of the 
historical process. Words represent existing 
formulations of consciousness. When people wish 
to speak out in a new way the desire arises from 
new life experience. On a vast scale this process 
can produce revolutions. When people are 
dissatisfied with inherited societal formulations of 
reality (governments, institutions, laws) they 
want to remake them nearer to their new and as yet 
unformulated experiences.
This is also how art is produced. It is the product 
of tension between changing socio-economic 
relations and outmoded consciousness. Art 
expresses in a virtual world the changes that are 
only starting to occur in the actual world. The 
artist does not express him or herself in art form. 
The artist finds the self expressed in them. Self- 
expression is not adulterated to make it 
fashionable. Self-expression is found only in the 
social relations embodied in art. Caudwell says 
that art is a social function. He claims that this is 
not a marxist prescription. It arises from the way 
in which art forms are defined. Only those 
processes with conscious social function are 
recognized as art forms. Caudwell believes that art 
is filled with ideas, social theory and prophecy.
He does not think, however, that propaganda is 
a substitute for art. He feels only contempt for H.G. 
Wells because he believes that Wells sold out art, 
science and action for his pathetic illusion that 
only propaganda changes the world. .
Caudwell links science and art (by art he usually 
means literature). Both are generated as part of the 
social process. They are social products, whether 
material or ideological. They can have only the 
goal of freedom. People seek freedom in their 
struggle with nature. It follows that freedom has a 
price, the need for action and labor. Both science 
and art are guides to action. They are more than 
guides. Since they are opposite poles of language, 
and the main function of language is persuasion, 
science and art are persuasion to action, to be and 
do differently. Poetry, according to Caudwell, is 
“ clotted social history” .
Over the past decade the notion that value free 
scientism in science and social science can solve 
all social problems via faultless diagnosis and 
social engineering has suffered a demise in 
prestige in the West. There is more frank 
acknowledgement that the choice of an area o f 
research is a value judgement as to its usefulness 
and that approaches are usually circumscribed by 
the institution financing the project and one’s own 
or employer’s perspectives. None of this would 
have surprised Caudwell. He said that the 
functionalist school of anthronology was not 
really functional. It did not include as functions 
of the society studied the “ civilised” equipment
that the observers themselves brought to their 
survey of primitive society.
Thirty years before R.D. Laing exposed a system 
of psychiatric care oriented to adjusting people to 
their society without challenging the normality of 
the society, Caudwell brought into question the 
premises of 20th century psychology. He noted 
that Adler recognized brutal struggles for 
existence in industrial civilization but lamented 
the inadequacy of Adler’s remedy — a chair of 
curative pedagogy. Caudwell claimed that Jung 
had betrayed science. The psychologist believed 
that behind mythology are primeval structures 
inherent in the mind. They interact with the 
patient’s ideology, thus generating myths. Jung’s 
approach was idealistic, concerned only with the 
mind. It ignored the environmental causes of 
mental disease. It failed to see that the problem is 
incurable if left only to the sphere of consciousness 
divorced from action.
If Caudwell is perceptive in his dismissal of 
Adler and Jung, he is ferocious in his attack on 
Freud because Freud’s view is marred not only by 
the limited affluent social group of patients who 
could afford to pay him but also because Freud’s 
view is premised on “ natural” freedoms and the 
liberal individual — the classic Western dualism. 
Freud saw all social activity as the product of the 
free will and dynamic urge of the individual (albeit 
a dark urge) as it emerges in its own consciousness 
that grappled directly with nature. Since its 
instinctive centre is the source of its freedom, 
restrictions placed on it by social relations cripple 
and distort the range o f action. Consequently the 
individual is seen as ranged against society. He or 
she is seen as separated from society as if by 
magic.
Freud’s view ignores that consciousness is a 
social outcome. It is not just that consciousness 
has a social component. The construction of 
consciousness is the socializing of the psyche. 
Caudwell spoke of the “ social ego” . There is no 
other. The organism does not enter consciously or 
of its own will into societal and environmental 
relations. The latter are prior to and they 
determine consciousness and will. In Caudwell’s 
view it is impossible to study psychology removed 
from  s o c io lo g y . Freud approached  his 
psychological study with the assumptions of a 
bourgeois idealist to whom nothing existed of 
reality but an unchanging backcloth in front of 
which ideas perform their parts.
Consistent with his view of interaction between 
base and superstructure, Caudwell says that 
criticism of concrete religion becomes a criticism of 
societal relations that engendered it. Caudwell’s 
nationality has much to do with the fact that he 
progresses from primitive religions to Christianity. 
It was the religion that he knew best. Magic was 
the origin of religion, resulting from a dialectical 
relation between elemental natural powers and
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societal production process. Primitive people made 
magic wish-fulfilment propositions about reality. 
In acting according to these propositions they 
imperceptibly found a determined pattern imposed 
on them by interaction with reality. So they prayed 
for rain at the start of the rainy season. Fertility 
rites were performed in spring. Because of its 
association with economic production, magic 
contained the correct operations for sowing and 
reaping or hunting. Consequently it crystallized 
the family and tribal social relations. It was a 
compendious calendar and tribal guide. It could be 
shared and handed down as tradition. Later it 
became either science or art.
Caudwell looks at Christianity in the same way. 
No matter how diverse its causes, Christianity 
once embodied the aspirations of an exploited 
class. It was initially a religion of revolution, 
having a tough this-worldly content. The kingdom 
of heaven was to be realized on earth. But 
Christianity was subverted into reformism. It 
never converted wide popular support into a 
program of action directed towards seizure of 
power. By ignoring the vital question of workers’ 
power, Jesus Christ ensured defeat for his 
communist program. His execution should have 
been seen as the first defeat in a long revolutionary 
war rather than as an other-worldly triumph, a 
wish-fulfilment victory.
Constantine discovered the emergence of a class 
of leaders who were willing to sell out in return for 
powerful administrative positions in his empire. 
All the revolutionary content of the Christian 
program — the kingdom of heaven and the 
millenium — was shifted to the next world. The 
love-feast at which material food was shared in 
common became the ideal sacrifice of the mass 
where only token food was shared. The misery of 
the exploited classes o f the Roman Empire that 
engendered a revolutionary program became a 
compensatory wish-fulfilment. It became a 
fantastic salvation criticizing and yet stabilising 
real misery on earth. Eventually the theoretical 
apparatus of Christianity was one side o f a 
dynamic relationship with the economic and 
political organization of feudal Europe.
Caudwell’s literary commentary is not the 
microscopic dissection of texts that has become 
standard practice in today’s Western academic 
world. There are questions that one wants to ask of 
Caudwell, particularly about the place of novels. 
Despite this, it is a deeply interesting and 
suggestive study of the relationship between 
literature and other aspects of society. Illusion 
and Reality is subtitled “ A study of the sources of 
poetry” .
Caudwell claims that industrial capitalism had 
several major effects on British poetry. Like 
everything else, poetry became a commodity. 
Separated from patrons and private incomes, 
poets had to sell their goods in the market place.
Poetry ceased being produced for particular 
audiences as in earlier oral art. It began to be 
turned out for an anonymous mass market via 
printing and publishing.
Although the poet did not have to worry about 
an income from poems, he knew that his art was 
treated by others as so many cheese products. The 
writer saw the self as an individualist striving to 
express the inner self against all the outward 
crippling structures of society. He was Faust, 
Milton’s Satan and Robinson Crusoe. (And in 
nearly every case, it was he rather than she.)
The individual Romantic such as Shelley, Byron 
or Wordsworth found in himself the source of 
literature. Ultimately all he could write about was 
his own creative process. His only heroes became 
poets or other extreme individualists. Keats said 
that his own creative process was so crucial that it 
would not matter if all his poems were burned as he 
wrote them. Art became art for art’s sake. Artists 
turned their lives into works of art. They became 
artists without needing to produce art. Far from 
being a social process, art became a form of 
anarchy. Caudwell instances dadaism.
The in d iv id u a lis t ic  poet p roposed  an 
individualistic program. He had to be free from 
everything but himself. He did not see that his 
retreat from society was caused by human 
relationships reduced to com m odities and 
impersonality. This correlates with Caudwell’s 
view of the
businessman who finds free competition impeded 
by price-cutting, cartels and trusts. He revolts by 
demanding keener competition. He does not 
realize that these ills are created by the free 
market. He demands an intensification of the 
process that dominates him. Similarly, the poet’s 
triumphant proclamation of liberty marked the 
very moment when liberty completely vanished 
from his hands. It is difficult to understand, then, 
how someone who subscribes to Raymond 
Williams’ views could find Caudwell simplistic. 
On Romantic poetry they are almost identical.
It would take many years to discover whether or 
not Caudwell has been just to each and every 
British writer and many more to research the 
numerous disciplines employed in his writings. 
M eanw hile it appears lik e ly  th at his 
comprehensive marxist methodology requires 
careful reading; for those who glibly dismiss it as 
crude and outdated, it requires careful re-reading.
— Graham Rowlands.
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HOW MUCH SHOULD WE BOAST IQ?
(Pseudo Science and Mental Ability by Jeffrey 
M. Blum, Monthly Review Press, March 1978,240 
PP-)
In capitalist societies the school, with its 
artificial, depersonalized and hierarchical social 
relations, is a fertile breeding ground for the 
maintenance and reproduction o f wider class 
divisions. For embedded deep within the school’s 
fabric, are the meritocratic concepts of sorting, 
streaming, grading and examining. All o f this is 
often quite at variance with the public rhetoric of 
education ministers, school principals, academics, 
teachers and others who forlornly plead for 
altruism, selflessness, and cooperation. The 
reality of schooling, as every student realizes, lies 
elsewhere. Moreover, in times o f acute economic 
crisis like the present, cutbacks, restrictions and 
other financial stringencies in education, health 
and welfare only serve to focus more sharply the 
bitter class struggle which lies at the heart of all 
capitalist societies.
Although it is currently re-emerging in a 
particularly stark and frightening form, 
meritocratic elitism has long underpinned the 
practice, if not always the theory, o f schooling 
under capitalism. The principal rationale for such 
practices has been the lingering infatuation with 
the notion of intelligence testing. It^is a point 
worth emphasizing that the genesis of intelligence 
testing corresponded historically with the 
expansion o f both industrial capitalism in Europe 
and the United States, and the rise of compulsory 
schooling. From its beginnings in England with 
the work o f Francis Galton, whose book 
Heriditary Genius (1869) first postulated the 
idea that intelligence was genetically determined, 
the drive to measure, assess and account for 
human intelligence has formed an integral part of 
psychological and educational practice.
Mental measurement and intelligence testing 
have had a colorful and controversial career. Its 
adherents include some of the most revered, and 
reviled names in educational psychology. In 
England its champions have been Karl Pearson, a 
student of Galton’s and founder of eugenics; Cyril 
Burt, a student of Pearson’s and staunch believer 
in the heritability of intelligence, whose findings 
are now under serious doubt arising from charges 
of fraud and deception in his statistical data; and 
Philip Vernon and Hans Eysenck, both close 
followers of Burt. Eysenck, possibly the most 
notorious of the current meritocrats, supports the 
heritability of intelligence on genetic grounds,
adding that there is a statistically significant 
superiority for whites over blacks in test scores for 
intelligence.
Across the Atlantic in America the furore over 
IQ, heredity and eugenics has had a similarly long 
and dismal history. Lewis M. Terman, o f Stanford 
University, developed a modification of Alfred 
Binet’s original intelligence test, which became 
widely known as the Stanford-Binet test. Terman 
was a thoroughgoing eugenicist and elitist, who 
believed that social stratification was founded on 
the distribution of IQ in the general population. 
Terman’s views, and the measurement mania 
generally, were strongly supported by E.L. 
Thorndike, G. S. Hall and L. L. Thurstone. Most 
recently Arthur Jensen, from the University of 
California, has joined forces with Hans Eysenck 
in asserting that com pensatory education 
programmes, designed to promote greater equality 
of opportunity, have failed. This, Jensen and 
Eysenck contend, is due to racial differences in 
intelligence. Such views justifiably aroused 
hostility, anger, and widespread opposition during 
their Australian tour late in 1977.
Fortunately, the nefarious and often scandalous 
history of intelligence testing has been subjected 
to close and rigorous examination in recent years. 
Notable contributors to the critique of ideological 
quackery masquerading as scientific intelligence 
testing include: Brian Simon’s Intelligence, 
Psychology and Education (1971); Gartner, 
Greer and Riessman, The New Assault on 
Equality (1974); Leon Kamin, The Science and 
Politics of IQ (1974); Clarence Karier, Shaping 
the American Educational State (1975); and 
Hilary and Steven Rose, The Political Economy 
of Science (1976). Each of these publications 
amply demonstrates the ways educational 
psychology has been enlisted as a prop for the 
prevailing capitalist order. Furthermore, that 
discipline has provided a veneer of respectability 
for concepts tailor made for a society based on 
technological efficiency and profit.
Jeffrey Blum’s Pseudoscience and Mental 
A bility is a welcome and useful addition to a 
growing body of critical work on the ideological 
function of much that passes for educational 
psychology. Blum’s study perceptively unravels 
theorigins and fallaciesofthelQcontroversy. In a 
clear, direct manner Blum scrutinizes six key 
hypotheses which underly the whole debate on IQ.
These are:
i) that there are genetically determined 
differences in mental capacity;
ii) that there is significantgenetic determination 
of variations in mental ability;
iii) that IQ tests measure mental ability;
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iv) that IQ tests measure abilities needed for 
success in high-level occupations:
v) that blacks are intellectually inferior;
vi) that blacks are innately intellectually inferior 
(pp. 13-22).
In each case Blum finds the evidence adduced by 
psychologists in support of such claims to be 
dubious in the extreme. Blum charges those who 
have strenuously espoused psychometrics and 
eugenics with practicising pseudoscience. He 
defines this as a sustained process o f false 
persuasion transacted by simulation or distortion 
of scientific enquiry and hypothesis testing (p.
145). In effect it is a process of false persuasion by 
scientific pretense, where the leaders in this field 
are those who manage to swallow the necessary 
corruption o f scientific practices, and then to 
delude themselves, their benefactors, and the 
public. This, Blum suggests, is precisely what the 
meritocrats and intelligence testers have done.
But it is principally in the context of schooling 
that the testing movement has had its major 
impact. Blum notes, when this movement reached 
full force after World War I, universal schooling 
was already a reality. Accompanying this 
development was the implementation of grading 
on standardized tests which meant that children 
were tracked into different curricula on the basis of
DISCUSSION
their performance. Hence schools came to be 
avowedly meritocratic institutions. Yet for this to 
be successful teachers, students, parents, and 
above all the testers themselves, must adopt 
attitudes traditionally espoused by the upper 
classes. In this way testing and measurement in 
schools facilitated the emergence of what Marx 
called bourgeois ideological hegemony. Where the 
bourgeoisie controls the most important cultural 
institutions it is able to generate a consensus 
around ideas congenial to it. This occurs all the 
more readily when the working class is weak 
politically and unable to assert itself (pp. 170-181).
What, then, should be done? Blum suggests a 
thorough revision of the image of mental ability is 
of paramount importance. Continued adherence to 
the notion of levels of intelligence serves only to 
perpetuate a divisive and foolish myth, since test 
scores can only describe performance: they do not 
explain it. A useful step forward would be the 
abolition of intelligence testing in schools and the 
concept of IQ along with it. This was done, in fact, 
in the USSR in 1936. The result was that 
psychologists consciously and productively 
turned their attention to investigating the 
learning process and facilitating it. In essence this 
is Blum’s solution too. It is a solution which we 
ignore at our peril.
Robert Mackie
AN INVESTMENT LED RECOVERY?
“But to the extent that the productive power 
develops, it finds itself at variance with the 
narrow basis on which the conditions of 
consumption rest." (1)
In the ALR No. 64 Economic Notes use 
simplifying assumptions in order to present 
valuable diagrams that show essential aspects of 
how a capitalist economy works. The product is 
shown as made up of capital goods such as 
machinery and consumption goods such as food 
and clothing. Profit is shown as purchasing the 
capital goods produced. Wages are shown as 
purchasing the consumer goods produced.
But then Economic Notes use this “ simple 
approach” to conclude that “ capital accumulation 
can proceed at any rate within limits ultimately 
determined by the rate o f exploitation” . “ Cutting 
working class living standards is not an 
impossibility for the capitalist class; it will not 
drive the system into a crisis o f under 
consumption. On the contrary, it is highly 
desirable from the capitalists’ point of view; all it
requires is an adjustment in the composition of 
output, by a shift away from producing 
consumption goods to producing more capital 
goods.”
Thus, if profit rises relative to wages, all that is 
required is a shift in the composition of the product 
from consumer goods to capital goods. Then the 
higher profit levels that result from increased 
exploitation will be matched by a higher output of 
capital goods, and the relative fall in wages will be 
matched by a decline in the output of consumer 
goods relative to the output o f capital goods. The 
accumulation of capital as a whole will proceed 
unchecked by this change in the composition of the 
product.
Economic Notes are correct in saying that this is 
the thinking behind Fraser’s “ investment led” 
recovery. Thus the 40 per cent investment 
allowance, and the attempts to reduce real wages, 
aimed to promote the capital goods and mining 
sectors relative to the consumer goods industries, 
and profit relative to wages.
In Volumes 2 & 3 of Capital, Marx had already 
criticised these conclusions in Economic Notes. 
Thus in Volume 2 he shows that the capital goods 
and the consumer goods industries are 
interdependent. Much o f the output of the capital
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goods industries such as machinery, steel and 
buildings is sold to the consumer goods industries. 
Thus continued growth in the capital goods 
industries is dependent on continued growth in the 
consumer goods industries.
In chapters 13, 14, and 15 of Volume 3 of 
Capital, Marx provides a lucid criticism of the 
view that increased exploitation can be smoothly 
offset from the point o f  view o f capital 
accumulation by a shift in the composition of 
output from consumer goods to capital goods. In 
fact, in Capter 15, he describes the more rapid 
growth in the capital goods industries as placing a 
recurring barrier to the process of capital 
accumulation.
The capitalist aims at maximising surplus value 
or profit on an ever-expanding scale. This implies 
increasing productive capacity and output at 
reduced cost per unit o f output. These objectives 
are realised by the introduction of new technology, 
the growth in the capital goods industries in terms 
of the analysis in Economic Notes. These 
objectives mean that costs, and particularly wages 
costs and therefore consumer spending, will be 
kept at a minimum and if possible, wages costs will 
be reduced per unit of output. Sonce wages are the 
main element in consumer spending, this means 
that consumption will rise less rapidly that output. 
Today inflation accentuates this trend inherent in 
capitalism. Marx makes the point that this 
emphasis on new technology explains why 
capitalism has carried through its historic role of 
expanding the productive powers of society.
Thus Marx and Economic Notes discuss the 
capital goods industries expanding rel itive to the 
consumer goods industries, and profit rising 
relative to wages. Economic Notes make the 
unqualified statement that these tendencies are 
“highly desirable from the capitalists point of 
view” . Marx also stresses that the capitalist will 
strive to expand investm ent relative to 
consumption, and profit relative to wages and how 
shows how this expands productive capacity and 
surplus value.
But then Marx goes on to show the contradiction 
inherent in these tendencies, a contradiction that 
explains overproduction, stagnation, and the 
development of a “Surplus o f Capital” and 
“ Surplus of Population” .
Marx shows that there are two stages in the 
production process. In the first stage, at the point 
of production, the primary aim is to maximise the 
production of purplus value and its reinvestment 
on an ever-expanding scale. In the language of 
mainstream economics, this means the emphasis 
is on profit relative to wages, and on investment 
(e.g. application of new technology) relative to 
consumer spending which is mainly dependent on 
the rate of growth in wages.
But “now comes the second act of the process” . 
The entire mass of commodities must be sold; that
is, value including surplus value must be 
“ realised” . Unless this is done, and at profitable 
prices, the worker has been exploited but “ none the 
less” the capitalist may be faced with “ a partial or 
complete loss o f his capital” .(2)
The conditions of direct exploitation and those 
of realization o f the products of labour are 
contradictory. In the first stage, the emphasis is on 
the expansion of the productive powers, of 
investment, relative to the rate of growth in wages, 
and therefore in consumption. In the next stage, 
the condition for realisation is that consumption 
will rise at a sufficient rate to purchase at 
profitable prices the expanding output that flows 
from the increased productivity of labour. Because 
of the class relationships in a capitalist society, 
Marx concludes that “ to the extent the productive 
power develops, it finds itself at variance with the 
narrow basis on which the condition o f 
consumption rest” . And again: “ Conflict must 
continually ensue between the limited conditions 
of consumption on a capitalist basis and a 
production which forever tends to exceed its 
imminent barriers” .
Economic Notes are correct in rejecting the view 
that the present recession in Australia is due to 
underconsumption, and underconsumption can be 
overcome by increasing wages. Recessions arise 
from the contradictions which have shown 
themselves to be inherent in the process of capital 
accumulation. In fact, the growth of “ the 
productive power” , relative to consumption, 
reflects the relative power structures of the main 
classes in a capitalist society.
But there is excess capacity in Australian 
industry, relative to demand. And “ sluggish” 
levels of consumer spending partly reflects 
reduced levels of after-tax real wages.
In periods o f capitalist expansion, such as the 
nineteenth century or the 1950s and 60s, this 
tendency for productive capacity to exceed 
demand resulted in recurring economic crisis 
which were of relatively short duration, apart from 
the 1930s. Today there is such a vast accumulation 
of capital goods that there is a chronic tendency to 
overproduction, and thus under-utilisation of 
resources, in the major western capitalist 
countries. This reality provides a background in 
which popular movements are growing which put 
the emphasis on reduced hours of labour and 
socially useful and satisfying labour in areas such 
as education, public transport, home building, 
urban renewal, etc.
— Charlie Silver
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